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First Amendment 
I. The News Media and the First Amendment 
.. A. Punishing Breaches of the COl!fidentiality of Judicial R~'view 
Commissions: Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia 
[Vol. 6:19 
In Landmark Communications~ Inc. v. Virginia, I the Supreme 
Court addressed the problem of accommodating a state's legitimate in-
terest in maintaining the confidentiality of proceedings before a state 
judicial review commission2 with the First Amendment guarantee that 
the news media shall be free of restrictions in discussing governmental 
affairs.3 The Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute4 which 
made it a misdemeanor for any person to divulge information concern-
ing proceedings before the state's Judicial Inquiry and Review Com-
mission.5 The Court's decision in Landmark serves to underscore the 
protection afforded the news media by the First Amendment when it 
engages in the "free discussion of governmental affairs."6 
1. The Virginia Supreme Court Decision 
The facts underlying the Landmark litigation are relatively sim-
ple.7 Landmark Communications, Inc., publishes The l'irginian-Pilot, 
a general circulation newspaper in the Tidewater area of Virginia. On 
October 4, 1975, the Pilot published an article stating in pertinent part 
that the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (hereinafter Com-
mission) had conducted a "formal hearing -concerning possible discipli-
nary action against" a judge in Norfolk, Virginia. The newspaper 
account included the judge's name, and went on to state that the hear-
1. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
2. Id. at 835. In recognition of this interest, the Court cited W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO 
JUDGES THE JUDGES 161-62 (1971); Buckley, The Commission on Judicial Qual!ftcations: An 
Allemptto Deal with Judicial Misconduct, 3 U.S.F.L. REV. 244,255-56 (\969). 
3. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). In Mills, the Court upheld the right ofa 
newspaper to publish an election day editorial urging voters to support changing their form 
of government. The Court noted: "Whatever differences there may exist about interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement th.lt a major purpose 
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Id. at 218 
(footnote omitted). 
4. VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973). 
5. This commission was created pursuant to VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10, which provides, 
inter alia, for the creation of a commission "vested with the power to investigate ... 
charges which would be the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge." 
6. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See note 3 supra. 
7. Except where otherwise noted, this summary of the facts is taken from the opinion 
of the Virginia Supreme Court. See Landmark Communications, Inc. \'. Virginia, 217 Va. 
699, 701-03, 233 S.E.2d 120, 122-23 (1977). 
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ing "apparently stemmed from charges of incompetence against the 
... judge." On November 5, 1975, Landmark was indicted for violat-
ing Virginia Code section 2.1-37.13, which provides that "[a]ll papers 
filed with and proceedings before the Commission . . . including the 
identification of the subject judge . . . shall be confidential and shall 
not be divulged by any person to anyone except the Commission, ex-
cept that the record of any proceeding filed with the Supreme Court 
shall lose its confidential character."s The code further provides that 
"[a]ny person who shall divulge information in violation ... of this 
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."9 In the subsequent trial, the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk found Landmark guilty of violat-
ing section 2.1-37.13 and fined the corporation the sum of $500.00. 
Landmark appealed its conviction to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. lO Its initial contention was that the statute's proscription against 
divulging information regarding Commission proceedings was ambigu-
ous in that it failed to indicate whether its sanctions applied only to 
participants in the proceedings or also to nonparticipating observers 
such as the news media. Landmark argued that the statute's penal na-
ture required that any such ambiguity be resolved against the Com-
monwealth and in favor of the alleged violator. II The newspaper 
urged the Virginia court to construe section 2.1-37.13 to mean that a 
violation would occur only upon "the first act of disclosure . . . by an 
individual who had actually participated in some manner in the pro-
ceedings of [the] Commission." 12 Under such a construction, 
Landmark contended, the statute had been violated not by the newspa-
per but by the Commission participant who first disclosed the confiden-
tial information. Landmark's subsequent publication of information 
"voluntarily and freely given to it" was therefore outside the scope of 
the statute. 13 The major constitutional argument raised by Landmark 
on appeal was that the imposition of the statute's criminal sanctions 
"would unconstitutionally abridge its First Amendment guaranty of 
freedom of the press."14 Landmark argued that the statute either con-
stituted an impermissible prior restraint l5 or imposed a subsequent 
8. VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973). 
9. Id. 
10. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. 699, 233 S.E.2d 120 (1977). 
11. £d. at 701,233 S.E.2d at 122. 
12. £d. at 702, 233 S.E.2d at 122-23 (emphasis in original). 
13. Id,233 S.E.2d at 123 (emphasis in original). 
14. £d. at 703, 233 S.E.2d at 123. 
15. Id. at 704, 233 S.E.2d at 124. Landmark based this contention on the decisions of 
the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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punishment for publication without satisfying the requisite "clear and 
present danger" elements necessary to impose such punishment. 16 
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Landmark's statutory 
construction argument, holding that the statute was clear and unambig-
uous in its terms and that its proscription applied to any person (in-
cluding corporate entities) who divulged information' regarding 
Commission proceedings before a complaint was filed with the state 
supreme courtY Turning to the constitutional claim, the state court 
disagreed with Landmark's contention that the statute imposed a prior 
restraint, finding instead that its provisions fit more properly into the 
subsequent punishment category. 18 This characterization compelled 
the court to subject the statute to a clear and present danger analysis. 
The court examined and then distinguished the administration of jus-
tice cases cited by Landmark. 19 Whereas those cases inyolved a court's 
common law power of contempt, and thus arose from the exercise of 
judicial power, the Virginia Supreme Court observed that the instant 
case was based on the violation of a statute designed to protect a legis-
latively determined state interest.20 The court asserted that the require-
ment of confidentiality was essential to preserve the legitimate state 
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the Commission and ensur-
ing the orderly administration of justiceY The Virginia Supreme 
Court concluded its opinion by accepting the Commonwealth's posi-
tion that criminal sanctions are a legitimate and necessary means to 
protect those state interests and prevent the clear and present danger 
16. 217 Va. at 705, 233 S.E.2d at 124. Landmark relied on a line of cases which had 
applied the "clear and present danger" test in overturning contempt citations based on me-
dia criticism of the manner in which courts were handling pending matters. These cases are 
discussed i'!fra: Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp \. Florida, 328 U.S. 
331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 
While the contempt citations stemmed from a perceived threat to "the Nderly administra-
tion of justice," the Supreme Court held in each case that expression critt.:aI ofa court or its 
operations is protected by the First Amendment unless it poses a clear and present danger to 
the system. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 449-59 
(1970); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 623-31 (5th ed. 1978). 
17. 217 Va. at 702-03, 233 S.E.2d at 123. 
18. Id. at 704, 233 S.E.2d at 124. 
19. See note 16 supra. 
20. 217 Va. at 707-08, 233 S.E.2d at 126-27. 
21. Id. at 712-13, 233 S.E.2d at 129. The court pointed out that the requirement of 
confidentiality provides the following benefits: "(I) protects the reputatil)n of an individual 
judge by shielding him from publicity involving frivolous complaints. (2) protects public 
confidence in the judicial system by preventing disclosure of a complamt against a judge 
until the Commission has determined the charge is well-founded, and (3) protects complain-
ants and witnesses from possible recrimination by prohibiting disclosm.! of their identity 
prior to a determination that the complaint is meritorious." Id. at 712,233 S.E.2d at 128-29. 
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which would result from premature disclosure of the Commission's 
proceedings.22 
2. The United States Supreme Court Decision 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.23 Chief Justice Burger, 
writing for the six-member majority,24 disagreed with the Virginia 
Supreme Court's conclusion that a clear and present danger to the ad-
ministration of justice justified the curtailment of speech by criminal 
sanctions.25 He noted that some form of confidential judicial inquiry 
and disciplinary procedure exists in virtually every state.26 The "sub-
stantial uniformity" of these plans suggested that "confidentiality is 
perceived as tending to insure the ultimate effectiveness of the judicial 
review commissions."27 But Landmark did not challenge the need for 
confidentiality in proceedings to review the conduct and integrity of 
judicial officers. Rather, it claimed only that confidentiality could not 
be preserved by the imposition of criminal sanctions on third parties 
not involved in the proceedings themselves, an approach that only one 
other state besides Virginia had found necessary to adopt.28 
In view of the foregoing, the Chief Justice formulated the issue in 
Landmark as follows: "The narrow and limited question presented, 
then, is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment 
22. !d. at 712-13,233 S.E.2d at 129. 
23. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
24. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist 
and Stevens. Justice Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Brennan 
and Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
25. 435 U.S. at 845. 
26. Id. at 834. The Chief Justice pointed out that 47 states, the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico have such judicial inquiry and disciplinary procedures. All of these juris-
dictions except Puerto Rico require confidentiality in the early stages of the proceedings. A 
list of the states and their relevant constitutional and statutory provisions was attached as an 
appendix to the opinion. !d. app., at 846-48. 
27. Id. at 835. Chief Justice Burger summarized the interests said to be served by the 
requirement of confidentiality as follows: "First, confidentiality is thought to encourage the 
filing of complaints and the willing participation of relevant witnesses by providing protec-
tion against possible retaliation or recrimination. Second, at least until the time when the 
meritorious can be separated from the frivolous complaints, the confidentiality of the pro-
ceedings protects judges from the injury which might result from publication of unexamined 
and unwarranted complaints. And finally, it is argued, confidence in the judiciary as an 
institution is maintained by avoiding premature announcement of groundless claims of judi-
cial misconduct or disability since it can be assumed that some frivolous complaints will be 
made against judicial officers who rarely can satisfy all contending litigants." Id. (footnote 
omitted). See note 2 supra. Confidentiality is also thought to facilitate the removal or 
retirement of judges without a formal proceeding with its attendant publicity, and to permit 
a judge to be made aware of valid complaints. 435 U.S. at 835-36. 
28. !d. at 836-37. 
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of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news 
media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding 
confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commis-
sion."29 Before examining this issue in light of the facts of the case, the 
Court considered Landmark's contention that recent decisions regard-
ing the truthful and even untruthful reporting about public officials30 
and the dissemination of accurate commercial information31 should be 
dispositive of the question presented. Holding that the speech in ques-
tion "lies near the core of the First Amendment,"32 the Court rejected 
the need to rely on the more tangential First Amendment values impli-
cated in the context of libel or commercial speech. As Chief Justice 
Burger observed: "The operations of the courts and the judicial con-
duct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."33 
The operation of the Commission was deemed such a matter of 
public interest, and Landmark's article of October 4 was found to have 
provided accurate factual information about its proceedings.34 In the 
Court's view, this reporting "clearly served those interests in public 
scrutiny and discussion of governmental affairs which the First Amend-
ment was adopted to protect. "35 
The Court responded to the Commonwealth's argument that the 
First Amendment does not protect the publication of information 
"which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential. "36 The state 
had relied on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn37 in support of this posi-
tion. In Cox the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
29. Id. at 837 (footnote omitted). In an accompanying footnote, the Court explained 
that while the statute in question might have been construed by the Virgima Supreme Court 
so as to apply only to participants to the proceedings and not to third parties, the broad 
construction given the statute by the lower court precluded a narrow reading by the 
Supreme Court since" 'it is not our function to construe a state statute contrary to the con-
struction given it by the highest court of a State.''' Id. at 837 n.9 (quoting O'Brien v. Skin-
ner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974». 
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
31. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro; 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
32. 435 U.S. at 838 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 64-65 (1970». 
33. 435 U.S. at 839. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). q. Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, 
the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the 
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice."). 
34. 435 U.S. at 839. 
35. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964». 
36. 435 U.S. at 840 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 17). VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10, pro-
vides, inter alia, that "[p]roceedings before the Commission shall be confidentiaL" 
37. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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ments shielded a newspaper from liability for invasion of privacy based 
on the accurate reporting of the name ofa deceased rape victim.38 Cru-
cial to the decision in Cox was the fact that the name of the victim had 
been revealed in a public proceeding.39 Moreover, the Court in Cox 
specifically reserved the question of the scope of First Amendment pro-
tection where, as in Landmark, public records are not involved.40 Be-
cause Cox did not answer the question presented, the Landmark Court 
undertook an inquiry to determine whether Landmark's actions were 
protected by the First Amendment. 
The Court examined the interests which the Commonwealth 
claimed were protected by the statute.41 The Court was willing to as-
sume that confidentiality serves legitimate state interests, but neverthe-
less concluded that this did not justify the imposition of criminal 
sanctions on third parties to the proceedings such as Landmark.42 
Chief Justice Burger noted that the Commonwealth had provided no 
factual basis to demonstrate the necessity for criminal proscriptions 
and emphasized that most states had not adopted such an approach.43 
Injury to official reputation does not constitute a sufficient justification 
for punishing otherwise protected speech.44 Consequently, the reputa-
tion of the courts as an institution merits no greater protection.45 Sup-
port for these conclusions was found in Justice Black's observation in 
Bridges v. Caltfornia:46 
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by 
shielding judges from public criticism wrongly appraises the 
character of American political opinion .... [A]n enforced si-
lence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dig-
nity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, 
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance 
respect.47 
Since the Commonwealth had not justified the burden its statutory 
scheme placed on protected speech, the Supreme Court reversed 
38. /d. at 495. 
39. /d. at 496-97. 
40. Id. at 497 n.27. 
41. Criminal sanctions were said to be necessary to prevent the public discussion of 
unfounded allegations of judicial misconduct and the premature disclosure of the details of 
proceedings before the Commission. See 435 U.S. at 840. See also note 27 supra. 
42. 435 U.S. at 841. 
43. /d. & n.12. 
44. /d. at 841-42 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964». 
45. 435 U.S. at 842. 
46. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
47. Id. at 270-71. See also id. at 291-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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Landmark's conviction.48 
In the final section of the Landmark opinion, the Court criticized 
the Virginia Supreme Court's reliance upon and mechanical applica-
tion of the clear and present danger test.49 A legislatively determined 
state interest was viewed as an insufficient basis for a judicial finding of 
a clear and present danger. 50 In the words of Chief Justice Burger: 
"Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when 
First Amendment rights are at stake."51 The Court disapproved of the 
Virginia court's attempt to distinguish Landmark from prior cases 
which had rejected findings of clear and present danger arising from 
out-of-court media commentaries.52 If anything, the Court noted, the 
threat to the administration of justice posed in those cases was more 
direct and substantial than that presented by Landmark s disclosure.53 
Referring to the availability of contempt powers to punish breaches of 
confidentiality by commission members and staff, as well as to oaths of 
secrecy sometimes required of commission members, staff and wit-
nesses, the Court concluded that "much of the risk [to the administra-
tion of justice] can be eliminated through careful internal procedures to 
protect the confidentiality of Commission proceedings.")4 Despite the 
availability of alternative measures for protecting the state's interest in 
confidentiality, the Court found that the "danger" embodied in 
Landmark's publication " 'is precisely one of the types of activity envi-
sioned by the Founders in presenting the First Amendment for 
48. 435 U.S. at 842, 845-46. 
49. Id. at 842-43: "Mr. Justice Holmes' test was never intended 'to e"'press a technical 
legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases.' Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 
U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Properly applied, the test requires a court 
to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from 
the particular utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, a$ well as its likeli-
hood, against the need for free and unfettered expression. The possibility that other meas-
ures will serve the State's interests should also be weighed." 
50. Id. at 844. See also Justice Pofrs dissent from the Virginia Supr.:me Court's deci-
sion, 217 Va. 699, 713, 233 S.E.2d 120, 129 (1977) (Polf, J., dissenting) "Just as a court 
cannot infer the existence of a clear and present danger from allegations m .ide in a contempt 
citation and adopt that inference as a conclusion of law, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 
(1962), a court cannot infer the existence of a clear and present danger from the mere enact-
ment of a penal statute." Id. 
51. 435 U.S. at 843. In support of the need for an independent judici.tl inquiry into the 
existence of a clear and present danger, the Chief Justice quoted from Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 318-79 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring). See 435 U.S. at 843-44. 
52. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra. 
53. 435 U.S. at 845. 
54. Id. (citing 435 U.S. at 841 n.12). 
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ratification.' "55 
Justice Stewart concurred in the Court's judgment but could not 
agree that section 2.1-37.13 was unconstitutionaP6 In his view, "[t]here 
could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in 
the quality of its judiciary."57 Based on this paramount concern, Jus-
tice Stewart recognized the legitimate "derivative interest" in maintain-
ing the confidentiality of Commission proceedings. 58 Thus, the state 
could constitutionally punish any individual who breached this confi-
dentiality.59 However, rather than attempting to enforce criminal sanc-
tions against an individual, Virginia sought to punish a newspaper for 
its publication of the information. This application of the statute to the 
press was deemed unconstitutional: "If the constitutional protection of 
a free press means anything, it means that government cannot take it 
upon itself to decide what a newspaper may and may not publish.',60 
3. Analysis 
Analysis of the questions raised and resolved in Landmark can 
best be accomplished by focusing on two aspects of the case. The first 
section that follows will discuss the extent to which Landmark is con-
sistent with the "clear and present danger" cases relied upon by the 
Virginia Supreme Court. The second section will examine the utility of 
applying the clear and present danger test in future media cases. 
a. Background of the Clear and Present .Danger Standard 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Bridges v. 
Cal!lornia,61 Pennekamp v. F/orida,62 Craig v. Harney63 and Wood v. 
55. Id. at 845 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962». 
56. 435 U.S. at 848 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 849. Because Justice Stewart refused to join the majority opinion, his concur-
rence must be taken as an endorsement of the state's right to punish any nonmedia individ-
ual or entity who divulges information concerning Commission proceedings. The majority 
declined to address the question of the possibility of imposing criminal sanctions on persons 
who actually participated in the proceedings. See id. at 837 & n.9. Indeed, the Court even 
suggested that such punishment would be constitutional. See id. at 841 n.12. But the major-
ity did not limit its holding to the protection of the news media; any third person who was a 
stranger to the proceedings is within the Court's decision. See id. at 837. Justice Stewart 
apparently wrote separately to emphasize his belief that First Amendment protections for 
the disclosure of confidential information should be extended only to members of the press. 
60. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
61. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
62. 328 U.S. 331 (1946). 
63. 331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
28 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 6:19 
Georgia64 constitute the "clear and present danger" cases upon which 
the Virginia Supreme Court relied in affirming Landmark's convic-
tion.65 Each of these-cases involved a lower court's use of the common 
law power of contempt to punish out-of-court statements concerning 
pending cases or investigations. Such statements, in the view of the 
courts, created a clear and present danger to the orderly administration 
of justice. 
Writing for the Court in Bridges, Justice Black reversed a decision 
of the California Supreme Court66 which upheld a ruling that the Los 
Angeles Times had been in contempt of court when it published an 
editorial urging a judge to imprison two criminal defendants then on 
trial. Justice Black began his analysis by noting that there had been no 
legislative determination that such out-of-court commentary posed a 
danger justifying punishment. 67 Thus, the decision by the California 
Supreme Court did not come up for review "encased in the armor 
wrought by prior legislative deliberation."68 Relying on language from 
Cantwell v. Connecticut,69 Justice Black noted that had there been an 
indication of legislative intent, such a " 'declaration of the State's pol-
icy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing con-
stitutional limitations.' "70 In the absence of such a legislative 
declaration, the Court in Bridges was reluctant to rely on the California 
courts' determinations that the editorials at issue had either an "inher-
ent" or "reasonable" tendency to interfere with the orderly administra-
tion of justice.71 Unfortunately, the Court failed to set forth with any 
specificity precisely what type of speech would be punishable under a 
clear and present danger analysis. Instead, Justice Black provided the 
following summary: "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present 
danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be 
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before 
utterances can be punished."72 
Five years later, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Penne-
64. 370 U.S. 375 (1962). 
65. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. at 700-13, 233 S.E.2d at 
125,29. 
66. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939), Compare Times 
Mirror v. Superior Court, IS Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d 1029 (1940). 
67. 314 U.S. at 260. 
68. Id. at 261. 
69. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (absence of a state policy restricting street discussion of reli-
gious affairs weighed heavily in reversal of defendant's conviction). 
70. 314 U.S. at 260 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 290. 307-08 (1940». 
71. 314 U.S. at 272-73. 
72. Id. at 263. 
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kamp v. Florida,73 Justice Reed recognized the vagueness of the 
Bridges standard and reiterated the Court's belief that clarity and defi-
niteness would somehow emerge in subsequent cases.74 The 
Pennekamp decision did not fulfill this expectation, however, only ad-
ding to the Bridges standard the requirement of "a solidarity of evi-
dence.'>75 The Pennekamp Court's major contribution to the clear and 
present danger test was not this addition to the guidelines but rather the 
instructions on how the required evidence is to be obtained. The 
Pennekamp Court noted that it was "compelled to examine for [itself] 
the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were 
made to see whether or not they do carry a threat of clear and present 
danger. . . ."76 The Virginia Supreme Court's failure to carry out this 
investigative process was a major factor underlying the Supreme 
Court's rejection of its analysis in Landmark. The Virginia court's reli-
ance solely on the legislative determination was deemed insufficient,77 
and Chief Justice Burger reiterated the importance of undertaking an 
independent judicial investigation.78 He concluded by asserting that if 
the Virginia court had undertaken such an inquiry it would have real-
ized that Landmark's article did not present a clear and present danger 
to the administration of justice?9 
Applying the guidelines established in Bridges and Pennekamp to 
the Court's decision in Landmark,80 it appears that the latter decision is 
73. 328 U.S. 331 (1946). 
74. £d. at 334. 
75. Id. at 347. The only other suggestion of a guideline for determining the existence of 
a clear and present danger appears in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion: "It is the 
focused attempt to influence a particular decision that may have a corroding effect on the 
process of justice, and it is such comment that justifies the corrective process." Id. at 366 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Yet even this statement provides little guidance since the na-
ture and extent of the "focused attempt" were not defined. 
76. Id. at 335. 
77. 435 U.S. at 844. The Court stated: "It was ... incumbent upon the Supreme Court 
of Virginia to go behind the legislative determination and examine for itself 'the particular 
utteranc[e] here in question and the circumstances of [its] publication to determine to what 
extent the substantive evil of unfair administration of justice was a likely consequence, and 
whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient to justify [subsequent] punishment.'" Id. 
(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941)). 
78. 435 U.S. at 844: "A legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the 
reasons impelling legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whether 
the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether the legisla-
tion is consonant with the Constitution." 
79. Id. at 844-45. See note 90 infra. 
80. Bridges and Pennekamp having established the basic, albeit vague, guidelines for 
applying the clear and present danger test, the primary significance of the two subsequent 
press cases, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 
(1962), is their reaffirmation of the requirement of an independent judicial investigation of 
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consistent with its predecessors insofar as it represents the continuation 
of the Court's policy of reversing the use by lower courts of the con-
tempt power to restrain out-of-court commentary by the media con-
cerning pending proceedings or investigations. Where the Landmark 
decision appears to break with precedent is in the Court's suggestion 
that the clear and present danger test is not applicable to cases like 
Landmark,8l a suggestion whose effect would be virtually to eliminate 
the test from the active lexicon of constitutional adjudication. 
b. The Future of the Clear and Present .Danger Test 
(1) The Question of Relevancy 
The Landmark decision significantly diminishes the usefulness of 
the clear and present danger standard in contempt of court prosecu-
tions of the news media. By questioning whether the test was relevant 
to the situation presented in Landmark,82 the Court may have elimi-
nated the last area in which it had been actively applied-the adminis-
tration of justice cases.83 
The Court began its discussion of the applicability of the standard 
by noting that the Virginia Supreme Court had relied on the test in 
rejecting Landmark's constitutional challenge to its conyiction.84 Dis-
approving this reliance, the Court criticized the use of the clear and 
present danger test in Landmark on two grounds: it questioned the 
relevancy of the test to the Landmark situation, and particularly re-
jected what it termed the "mechanical application" of the test by the 
state court.85 Although the Court did not set forth specific support for 
its contention that the test was not relevant to the question presented in 
the alleged threat to the administration of justice. The only additional guidelines these cases 
provided were as follows: 1) The Court in Craig asserted that the danger "must not be 
remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." 331 U.S. at 376. Craig also indi-
cated that publications which were merely in bad taste could not be considered dangerous. 
Id. at 377. 2) In Wood, the Court overturned a contempt citation for critkizing the charging 
of a grand jury and interfering with its investigation. Relying on the Eridges-Pennekamp 
standard, the Court based its reversal on the failure of the lower court to adduce evidence 
demonstrating an actual interference with justice, 370 U.S. at 386-88, .md the failure to 
adhere to legislative limitations on the use of the contempt power. Id. at 385-86 & n.lO. In 
making this latter ground an explicit basis for its decision, see id., the Court reaffirmed the 
prior legislative deliberation doctrine of Bridges. See notes 67-68 and .lccompanying text 
supra. 
81. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra. 
82. 435 U.S. at 842. 
83. T. EMERSON, supra note 16, at 456. 
84. 435 U.S. at 842. 
85. Id. Quoting from Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring), the Landmark Court noted that the test had never been intended to provide a 
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Landmark, it substantiated this view by measuring the evidence 
presented by the Commonwealth of Virginia against the requirements 
established in Bridges and Pennekamp.86 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia had conceded that the record was devoid of actual facts demon-
strating a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 87 It 
nonetheless held that the legislative declaration that such a danger 
would exist, coupled with the stipulated fact that Landmark published 
the article, was sufficient to warrant the imposition of a criminal sanc-
tion.88 The propriety of the Virginia court's reliance on this legislative 
determination was emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court: "Def-
erence to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First 
Amendment rights are at stake."89 In Chief Justice Burger's view, ifthe 
Supreme Court of Virginia had looked behind the legislative declara-
tion and examined the particular facts surrounding the speech at issue, 
it would not have found any threat to the administration of justice suffi-
ciently serious to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions.90 Thus, 
the absence of an adequate factual basis for Landmark's conviction 
seems to have been one ground for the Court's view that the clear and 
present danger test was inapplicable in that context.91 
A second basis for regarding this test as unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of Landmark is the Court's characterization of the speech at issue 
as lying "near the core of the First Amendment."92 Citing as an exam-
ple its ruling in Buckley v. Valeo,93 the Court concluded that the Com-
monwealth's asserted interests were insufficient to justify the 
encroachment on freedom of speech and of the press that follow from 
the imposition of criminal sanctions.94 The Court's subsequent analy-
formula or technical legal doctrine for adjudicating free speech cases. 435 U.S. at 842. See 
note 49 supra. 
86. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text supra. 
87. 217 Va. at 707, 233 S.E.2d at 126. 
88. /d. at 708-09, 233 S.E.2d at 126-27. 
89. 435 U.S. at 843. See note 51 supra. 
90. 435 U.S. at 84445. The Court noted that the threat to the administration of justice 
posed in Landmark was less direct and substantial than that claimed to arise in Bridges, 
Pennekamp, Craig and Wood. It concluded that if the requirements of the clear and present 
danger test could not be satisfied in those cases, they could not be met in Landmark. Id. at 
845. 
91. The decision in Landmark brings the Court closer to acceptance of the "full protec-
tion rule." As discussed by T. EMERSON, supra note 16, at 457: "Under that doctrine a 
communication critical of the court could be punished or suppressed only if it amounted to 
'action' rather than 'expression.''' The author suggests that threats of physical violence or 
an employer's threats to employees would be examples of such "action." 
92. 435 U.S. at 838. 
93. 424 U.S. I (1976). 
94. 435 U.S. at 838. In Bllckley, the Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality 
32 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 6:19 
sis focused on the public interest in the operation of the Judicial In-
quiry and Review Commission. Landmark's article was found to have 
accurately reported on its proceedings, a function which promoted val-
ues central to the First Amendment.9s The Court relied on its prior 
decisions which had underscored the amenability of judges and the ju-
diciary to criticism voiced in the press.96 The subsequent discussion of 
the clear and present danger test was therefore a response to the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's analysis rather than a basis for the decision in 
Landmark. 
(2) The Alternative Means Analysis 
As noted earlier,97 the administration of justice cases constitute 
one of the last areas in which the Court, prior to Landmark, had uti-
lized the clear and present danger test. One factor the Court appar-
ently considered in striking down the criminal conviction in Landmark 
was that the Virginia statute, with its imposition of criminal sanctions, 
was out of step with the laws of over forty states, none of which "found 
it necessary to enforce confidentiality by use of criminal sanctions 
against nonparticipants."98 The Court noted that these other states 
only punish breaches of confidentiality by commission members and 
staff, and that such breaches are punishable as civil contempt rather 
than criminal violations.99 The Court also noted that some states re-
quire witnesses as well as staff and commission members to take an 
oath of secrecy. A violation of this requirement is similarly treated as 
contempt. 100 While the Court did not consider these sister state ap-
proaches to ensuring confidentiality dispositive of the issue before it, 101 
of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Responding to 
the argument that compelled disclosure of the identity of campaign contributors infringed 
the right of associational privacy, the Court conceded that a "mere showing of some legiti-
mate governmental interest" would be insufficient to justify such an encroachment upon 
First Amendment values. The appropriate analysis, the Court held, involves strict scrutiny 
of the asserted state interests to determine whether there is a "relevant correlation" or "sub-
stantial relation" between the governmental interest and the information to be disclosed. 
424 U.S. at 64. 
95. 435 U.S. at 839 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 
(1964)). 
96. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941); id. at 289, 
291-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
97. See text accompanying note 83 supra. 
98. 435 U.S. at 841 (footnote omitted). 
99. Id. at 841 n.12. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 841. 
Fall 1978] CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 33 
it seems reasonable to assume that the existence and widespread use of 
non-criminal alternative means for protecting the asserted state inter-
ests was a significant factor in the Court's resolution of Landmark. 102 
The widespread use of civil contempt sanctions and other non-criminal 
approaches to ensuring confidentiality points to another reason for the 
inapplicability of the clear and present danger test in situations such as 
that presented in Landmark. Legislatures are now cognizant of the fact 
that when the news media criticizes the functioning of the judiciary, 
courts should hold such criticism fully protected by the First Amend-
ment unless it goes so far as to amount to "action" instead of expres-
sion.103 Consequently, most state legislatures now protect the 
confidentiality of their judicial review commission proceedings through 
non-criminal sanctions aimed primarily at participants. 104 The effect of 
this trend is to limit the use of the clear and present danger test to those 
rare situations in which the speech at issue creates an imminent danger 
of harm. 105 
c. The Publication of Legally Co'!ftdential I'!!ormation 
One further aspect of the Landmark decision merits discussion in 
this review, although it is not related to the clear and present danger 
analysis previously discussed. The Commonwealth had argued in 
Landmark that the First Amendment right of a free press to report on 
and criticize judicial conduct did not extend to the publication of infor-
mation " 'which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential.' "106 
The Commonwealth relied on the Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting 
Cop. v. Cohn 107 to support this contention. In Cox the Court held that 
102. The Court noted that its prior decisions had struck down the suppression of speech 
claimed necessary by a state to protect the reputations of its judges or to maintain the institu-
tional integrity ofits courts. Id. at 841-42 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 272-73 (1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941». These principles 
were deemed controlling and dispositive of the criminal punishment issue in Landmark. 435 
U.S. at 842. 
103. See note 91 supra. 
104. The Court did not indicate whether it would consider these non-criminal ap-
proaches constitutionally valid in a fact situation similar to that presented in Landmark. 
The Court pointed out that the scope of other states' non-criminal sanctions is limited by 
their application solely to participants to the proceedings, as opposed to the Virginia stat-
ute's broad prohibition against disclosure by "any person." 435 U.S. at 841 & n.12. Thus it 
remains possible that a legislative enactment prohibiting the disclosure of confidential infor-
mation by a non-participant (i.e., a newspaper) might be found unconstitutional by the 
Court irrespective of the nature of the punishment imposed. 
105. See note 91 supra. 
106. 435 U.S. at 840 (citing Brief for Appellee at 17). 
107. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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a civil action would not lie against a television station for invasion of 
privacy based on the broadcast of the name of a deceased rape victim 
obtained from public records.108 The Landmark Court rejected the 
Commonwealth's reliance on Cox since that decision had explicitly re-
served the broader question of "whether the publication of truthful in-
formation withheld by law from the public domain is similarly 
privileged."109 The Court in Landmark also refused to deal fully with 
the question left open in Cox. Noting its belief that Cox did not pro-
vide a dispositive answer to the question presented in Landmark, the 
Court concluded: "We need not address all the implications of that 
question here, but only whether in the circumstances of this case 
Landmark's publication is protected by the First Amendment."11O 
Since the Court proceeded to hold that the publication could not be 
criminally punished, III it can be inferred that the Court answered the 
Cox question in the affirmative. In the wake of Landmark, newspapers 
would appear to be free to publish truthful information withheld from 
the public domain, insofar as that information pertains to judicial re-
view commission proceedings in which the newspaper is not a partici-
pant. A more general grant of privilege cannot fairly be inferred from 
Landmark given the intent of the Court to limit their resolution of the 
Cox question to the facts in Landmark. 
B. Searches of Newspaper OJlices: Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,112 the Supreme Court addressed a 
controversy regarding a different facet of the non-participant observer 
role of the news media than was confronted in the Landmark I 13 case. 
The issue in Zurcher was how the terms of the Fourth Amendment, 114 
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, 115 should be 
construed in the context of a third-party search 116 of a newspaper of-
108. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra. 
109. 435 U.S. at 840 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 497 n.27). See 
note 40 and accompanying text supra. 
110. 435 U.S. at 840. 
111. Id. at 841-42. 
112. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
113. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), For a discussion 
of Landmark, see notes 1-111 and accompanying text supra. 
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue. but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
115. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
116. The Supreme Court characterized a third-party search as "the recurring situation 
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fice. The object of the search in Zurcher was evidence pertaining to 
criminal activity which a member of the newspaper staff may have pho-
tographed and written about, but in which he did not participate. The 
crucial question in the case was procedural: whether such evidence can 
properly be obtained by means of a search warrant or whether its pro-
duction must be compelled by service of a subpoena duces tecum. 
A federal district court ruled that the First Amendment protects 
newspapers from being subjected to searches pursuant to a warrant, 
except where a clear showing could be made that upon service of a 
subpoena the evidence sought would be removed from the jurisdiction 
or destroyed, notwithstanding the issuance of a restraining order in 
conjunction with the subpoena.117 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed per curiam, adopting the opinion of the district 
court. 118 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 119 and subsequently re-
versed the lower court decisions. 
1. The Decision 
The fact situation underlying the Zurcher litigation is uncompli-
cated. 120 On Friday, April 9, 1971, demonstrators then occupying the 
administrative offices of the Stanford University Hospital engaged in a 
violent altercation with nine police officers in a hallway of the occupied 
building. The officers were part of a joint force comprised of officers 
from the Santa Clara County Sheriffs and Palo Alto Police Depart-
ments, who had been called to the scene by the hospital director to oust 
the demonstrators. The latter had barricaded the doors to both ends of 
a hallway next to the administrative offices. After peaceful means 
failed to persuade the demonstrators to leave, the police forced their 
way in through the west end of the hallway. Simultaneously, the dem-
onstrators, a~ed with sticks and clubs, burst through the east end of 
the hallway, attacking and injuring the nine officers stationed there. 
Since the police photographer and most other bystanders had congre-
gated at the west end of the hall, few of the assailants were identified; 
where state authorities have probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other 
evidence of crime is located on identified property but do not then have probable cause to 
believe that the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime that has 
occurred or is occurring." 436 U.S. at 553. 
117. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), cifid, 550 F.2d 464 
(9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
118. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
119. 434 U.S. 816 (1977). 
120. The summary of the facts of the case is taken from the Supreme Court opinion. 436 
U.S. at 550-52. 
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however, the officers did see someone photographing the fight from the 
east end of the hall. 
In a special edition published the following Sunday, the Sta'!!ord 
Daily, the student newspaper of Stanford University, carried articles 
and photographs concerning the hospital demonstration and the hall-
way incident. The photographs carried the byline of a Daily staff mem-
ber and indicated that he had been present at the east end of the 
hallway, giving rise to the inference that he might have photographed 
the assault on the nine officers. Accordingly, on the following day the 
Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office requested a warrant 
from the municipal court authorizing an immediate search of the 
Daily's offices for any evidence the newspaper may have obtained re-
garding the hospital fight. The warrant was issued based on the munic-
ipal court's findings of "just, probable and reasonable cause for 
believing that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material 
and relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Bat-
tery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with a Deadly Weapon, will be 
located [on the premises of the Daily].' "121 The affidavit supporting 
the request for the search warrant did not link any Dai(I' staff members 
with the unlawful activity. 
Later that same day four policemen searched the Daily's offices, 
accompanied by several Daily staff members. The officers inspected 
photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks and wastepaper bas-
kets; locked rooms and drawers were not searched. The search yielded 
only those photographs which had already been published; no new evi-
dence was discovered. Approximately one month later, the Daily and 
members of its staff instituted a civil action in federal court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief against all law enforcement agents re-
sponsible for the issuance and execution of the warrant. 122 The com-
plaint alleged that the search of the Daily's offices under color of law 
had denied the newspaper and its staff of rights guaranteed to them by 
the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
The district court refused to issue an injunction but did grant the 
121. 436 U.S. at 551 (quoting language from the search warrant, app. 31-32, issued Apr. 
12, 1971, Santa Clara County Municipal Court). 
122. The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), \\hich provides that, 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 
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.Daily's request for declaratory relief. 123 Although acknowledging the 
existence of probable cause to believe that relevant evidence regarding 
the criminal activity would be found in the .Daily's office, the court 
nonetheless held that under the circumstances a search warrant was a 
constitutionally impermissible means of obtaining such evidence. 124 
Rather, the use of a subpoena duces tecum, unless made impracticable 
by the circumstances, was regarded by the district court as the appro-
priate procedure for third-party searches where the possessor of the evi-
dence is not suspected of any crime. 125 
First Amendment considerations played a significant role in the 
district court decision. The defendants' contention that newspapers, re-
porters and photographers have no greater Fourth Amendment protec-
tions than other citizens was held to be without merit. 126 Judge 
Peckham reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment is not superfluous. 
Numerous cases have held that the First Amendment 'modifies' the 
Fourth Amendment to the extent that extra protections may be re-
quired when First Amendment interests are involved."127 The court 
examined the threats to freedom of the press said to arise more readily 
from the use of a search warrant than from employing a subpoena: 1) 
police officers executing such warrants would, owing to the generally 
disorganized nature of newspaper offices, have the opportunity to rum-
mage through drawers and cabinets, thus endangering confidential 
materials and relationships; 128 2) unlike a subpoena duces tecum, 
search warrants are issued and executed ex parte, which deprives the 
newspaper and its staff of the protections afforded by "judicial con-
trol"; 129 and 3) police searches might also jeopardize the newspaper's 
123. 353 F. Supp. at 136. 
124. Id. at 127. 
125. Id. The court noted that impracticability could be established by a showing that the 
materials sought would be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction despite a restraining 
order. Id. at 133. 
126. Id. at 134. 
127. Id. (emphasis in the original) (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 
(1964) (seizure of allegedly obscene books); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) 
(seizure of allegedly obscene magazines); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (seizure 
of organization's membership lists); Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1960) 
(seizure of allegedly obscene motion picture film), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
401 U.S. 990 (1971); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. 
den;ed, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (seizure of allegedly obscene motion picture film». None of 
these cases dealt specifically with warrantless searches of newspaper offices. 
128. 353 F. Supp. at 134-35. Such incursions by law enforcement agencies were thought 
to have the potential for chilling the exchange of information these confidential relationships 
foster, ultimately affecting the ability of the press to gather news. Id. 
129. Id. at 135. In support of the need for such 'judicial control" over searches of news-
papers, the court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (majority opinion), 710 (pow-
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credibility and create a risk of self-censorship. 130 
In the view of the district court, a police search of a newspaper 
office creates an "overwhelming threat" to the proper functioning of 
the press, especially where less drastic means can be employed to se-
cure the needed information. 131 The court therefore held that third-
party searches of newspapers are constitutionally impermissible except 
where there is a clear showing before a magistrate that the materials 
sought will be destroyed or removed and that a restraining order would 
be futile. 132 Since the defendants had not made such a showing, the 
court declared the search of the Daily's offices to have been 
unlawful. 133 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 134 Writing 
for the majority,135 Justice White characterized the district court deci-
sion as placing such a severe burden on the state to justify the use of a 
search warrant that "the effect of the rule is that fruits, instrumentali-
ties, and evidence of crime may be recovered from third parties only by 
subpoena, not by search warrant." 136 The Court contrasted this 
"sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment" by the district court 
with the language of the Amendment and its subsequent interpretation 
in the federal judicial system, concluding that there was no direct au-
thority for the rule propounded by the lower court. 137 Justice White 
ell, J., concurring). Branzburg involved a newspaper reporter subpoenaed to testify before a 
grand jury regarding the sources for one of his stories. 
130. 353 F. Supp. at 135. 
131. N. 
132. Id. Judge Peckham underscored his concern for First Amendment values by ad-
ding: "To stop short of this standard would be to sneer at all the First Amendment has come 
to represent in our society." Id. 
133. Id. The court also dismissed defendants' contentions that the Duily and members of 
its staff lacked standing to question the legality of the search and that this question was 
moot. Id. at 135-36. 
134. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
135. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice5 Blackmun, Powell 
and Rehnquist. Two dissenting opinions were filed, one by Justice Ste\\art, who was joined 
by Justice Marshall, and a second by Justice Stevens. Justice Powell \\fote a separate con-
curring opinion in which he addressed the issues raised in Justice Stewart's dissent. Justice 
Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
136. 436 U.S. at 553. 
137. Id. at 554: "It is an understatement to say that there is no direct authority in this or 
any other federal court for the District Court's sweeping revision of the Fourth Amend-
ment." (footnote omitted). 
The district court had focused upon the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties, 
noting that few reported cases touched even generally upon the issue. 353 F. Supp. at 127. 
The district court was unable to cite any cases dealing specifically with whether or when a 
subpoena duces tecum should be used in lieu of a search warrant. Observing that the Fourth 
Amendment rights of third parties had previously been considered only in the context of 
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began his examination of the prior cases construing and applying the 
Fourth Amendment by quoting from the Court's recent decision in 
Fisher v. United States. 138 In Fisher the Framers' approach to personal 
privacy was interpreted to mean that "when the State's reason to be-
lieve incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, 
the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and 
seize will issue."139 Justice White also referred to the Court's decision 
in Camara v. Municipal Court. 140 In Camara the question of whether 
or not an administrative search warrant should issue under the stan-
dard of probable cause was said to tum on a balancing of the govern-
mental interest justifying the intrusion against the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. 141 Finally, Justice White observed that a 
recent decision of the Court142 established that search warrants are not 
directed at persons but rather at "places" and "things," so that a war-
rant need not even name the person from whom the property will be 
seized. 143 
Based on this analysis of Fourth Amendment precedent, the Court 
standing to challenge the legality of a search, see, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 
165 (1969), the district court went on to examine state court cases dealing with what it be-
lieved to be an analogous situation to that presented in the instant case-the rights of third 
parties in the face ofa warrantless seizure of property by the police. See Owens v. Way, 141 
Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895); 
Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923). In Commodity Mfg., the 
New York Supreme Court came closest to anticipating the district court's position: "No case 
has been cited where the court has gone so far as to say that property, not an instrument of a 
crime, but only evidence of its commission, and which was the property of someone besides 
the defendant, could be seized either under a search warrant or as an incident of an arrest of 
defendant. 
"I can well believe that property used in the commission of a crime, even though be-
longing to a third party, might properly be seized, and also that property not used in the 
commission of the crime, but containing evidence of the commission of the crime, might 
properly be seized, where it is the property of the accused; but to sanction the seizure 0/ the 
property 0/ innocent persons, or persons not accused, not used in the commission 0/ the crime, 
but merely because they contained evidence 0/ the crime, would open the door to grave abuses 0/ 
invasion o/property rights." 198 N.Y.S. at 47 (emphasis added). 
Justice White rejected as inapposite the district court's reliance upon these cases, as well 
as its reliance on Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (a showing ofproba-
ble cause to believe that a subpoena would be an impracticable alternative is required before 
a court can issue a warrant for the arrest of a material witness). Zurcher v. Stanford Dailey, 
436 U.S. at 554 n.5. For a discussion ·of the lower court's analysis of the applicability of 
Bacon, see notes 206-10 and accompanying text infra. 
138. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
139. Id. at 400, quoted in 436 U.S. at 554. 
140. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
141. Id. at 534-35. 
142. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). 
143. See id. at 155 n.15. 
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concluded that the state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws and in 
recovering evidence of violations ofthose laws is the same regardless of 
the degree of culpability attributable to the person occupying the prem-
ises to be searched or in possession of the evidence to be seized. l44 The 
Court thus rejected the premise underlying the district court holding, 
which Justice White found to be "that State entitlement to a search 
warrant depends on the culpability of the owner or possessor of the 
place to be searched and on the State's right to arrest him."145 In sup-
port of this rejection of the lower court's position, the Court cited both 
Camara and See v. City of Seattle 146 for the proposition that the state 
need not rely on an individual's culpability as a prerequisite to the issu-
ance of a search warrant. Camara and See were challenges to convic-
tions for refusal to permit warrantless searches of commercial 
property.147 The search in each instance was to have been conducted 
by representatives of municipal administrative agencies (housing and 
fire department inspectors), and was intended to ensure compliance 
with local housing and fire ordinances. 148 Justice White. writing for the 
majority in both Camara and See,149refused to follow the Court's ear-
lier decision in Frank v. Maryland150 and held that in civil as well as 
criminal cases, the Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be 
issued before officials enter a private citizen's home or business prem-
ises.l5l Since the culpability of the individual property holders in 
Camara and See was deemed irrelevant to the state's right to conduct 
searches of their property, the Zurcher Court reasoned that culpability 
on the part of the Daily or its staff need not be a consideration in the 
case before it. 152 Consequently, the Court concluded that, "[t]he criti-
144. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 555. 
145. Id. 
146. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
147. Appellant in Camara had been charged with violating San Francisco Housing Code 
§ 507 and sought a writ of prohibition against his prosecution in state court. Appellant in 
See was convicted of violating the City of Seattle Fire Code § 8.01.150. These statutes made 
criminal the refusal to permit an inspection by the housing and fire authorities, respectively. 
148. The endorsement of these warrantless searches by the lower courts in each case was 
based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 
(1959). The Court in Frank had ruled that a search warrant was not a necessary prerequisite 
to an entry into a citizen's home to investigate sanitary conditions pursu.mt to a local health 
ordinance. 
149. Justice White was joined in each case by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, 
Douglas, Brennan and Fortas. A dissenting opinion covering both cases was filed by Justice 
Clark, who was joined by Justices Stewart and Harlan. 
150. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See note 148 supra. 
151. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 546. 
152. 436 U.S. at 555-56. The validity of this reading of Camara is questionable in light 
of the facts underlying that case. The Court's opinion in Camara reveals that appellant 
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cal element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property 
is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the 
property to which entry is sought."153 In support of this conclusion, 
Justice White analyzed a prior casel54 which had challenged the right 
of police officers to search a car and seize contraband therefrom when 
the occupants were not subject to arrest. The Court there rejected the 
claim that the right of police to search was dependent on the right to 
arrest. 155 Justice White combined this rule with more recent interpreta-
tions of the Fourth Amendment, as reflected in Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure,156 and found that "it is untenable to con-
clude that property may not be searched unless its occupant is reason-
ably suspected of crime and is subject to arrest."157 In the Zurcher 
Court's opinion, the Fourth Amendment had established the proper 
balance between privacy interests and public need, and the interpreta-
tion of that Amendment postulated by the district court was therefore 
unnecessary and burdensome. 158 
In the next section of the majority opinion, the Court examined 
the reasons advanced by the district court in support of its decision. 
Justice White first questioned whether the lack of culpability on the 
part of the property owner requires the use of a subpoena rather than a 
search warrant. He noted that the .Daily and its staff had conceded that 
if a third party knows that there is contraband on his premises, he is 
then sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance of a search warrant. 159 
And once an innocent third party is apprised of the existence of such 
evidence on his property, there is no reason why he should then be 
Camara was suspected of using the rear portion of his leasehold as a personal residence in 
violation of the building's occupancy permit. See 387 U.S. at 526. It was with knowledge of 
this possible violation that the housing inspector confronted appellant and requested permis-
sion to inspect the premises. Upon appellant's subsequent refusals to permit entry, he was 
arrested for violating the municipal housing code. See note 147 supra. It appears, therefore, 
that his possible culpability was a factor motivating the request to search the premises. See 
387 U.S. at 526-27. 
153. 436 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted). 
154. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
ISS. Id. at 158-59. 
156. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 n.l (1965). 
157. 436 U.S. at 559. See United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 536 F.2d 699, 703 
(6th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). 
158. 436 U.S. at 559. The Court therefore held that, "the courts may not, in the name of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, forbid the States from issuing warrants to search for 
evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not then 
reasonably suspected of criminal involvement." Id. at 560. 
159. Id. 
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allowed to object to the search, withhold the evidence and insist upon 
service of a subpoena duces tecum. 160 
The Court also considered the potential impact of a subpoena re-
quirement on the efficiency and success of law enforcement efforts. 
The Court posited two difficulties such a requirement would bring 
about and characterized them as creating "[serious] hazards to criminal 
investigation." 161 The first of these is that the seemingly innocent third 
party might not actually be blameless and may in fact be connected 
with or sympathetic to those who are culpable. Arguably such an indi-
vidual could not be relied upon to retain evidence that might implicate 
or otherwise harm his friends. Secondly, the Court voiced concern that 
any close relationship between the third party and those suspected of 
criminal acts would result in the "real culprits [having] access to the 
property ... [which] could easily result in the disappearance of the 
evidence, whatever the good faith of the third party."162 In view of 
these potential impediments to the efforts of law enforcement agencies, 
the Court concluded that the use of search warrants is necessary to se-
cure and preserve valuable evidence. 163 
The final section of the majority opinion addressed the question of 
whether and to what extent First Amendment considerations should 
modify the application of the Fourth Amendment when the subject of 
the search is a newspaper office. Justice White began by reciting the 
threats to the due functioning of the press claimed by the .Daily to arise 
from such searches: I) physical disruption resulting in publication de-
lays; 2) loss of confidential sources; 3) deterrence of the recording and 
preserv~tion of information; 4) chilling of the processing and dissemi-
nation of news; and 5) resort to self-censorship on the part of the 
press. 164 After acknowledging that the struggle which gave birth to the 
Fourth Amendment was largely one" 'between the Crown and the 
press,' "165 Justice White briefly reviewed the judicial history of the ten-
sion" between the First and Fourth Amendments. He referred to prior 
160. Id. This assertion by the Court seems to ignore the possibility that the innocent 
third party may have a valid objection to the search on the ground that it is an unnecessary 
and unreasonable invasion of privacy. 
161. Id. at 561. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 563. For an analysis of this aspect of the Court's opinion, see notes 232-35 
and accompanying text infra. 
164. 436 U.S. at 563-64. 
165. £d. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965). The Court also 
noted that "[w]here the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amend-
ment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exacti-
tude.''' 436 U.S. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. at 485). 
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decisions of the Court which had invalidated as too broad a warrant 
authorizing the search of a private home for materials relating to the 
Communist Party,166 and which rejected as unconstitutional searches 
pursuant to a warrant where the required showing of probable cause 
was not made before a neutral and disinterested magistrate. 167 But in 
contrast to the district court's view that these First Amendment consid-
erations require the use of a subpoena rather than a search warrant, 168 
the Court concluded: 
[T]he prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the 
warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First 
Amendment interests would be endangered by the search. As we 
see it, no more than this is required where the warrant requested 
is for the seizure of criminal evidence reasonably believed to be 
on the premises occupied by a newspaper. 169 
Having articulated this standard for the issuance of warrants au-
thorizing searches of newspaper offices, the Court examined the specific 
harms cited by the district court in support of its rule requiring the use 
of subpoenas. Justice White first stated his confidence in the ability of 
local magistrates to guard against searches of the type and scope that 
would actually interfere with the timely publication of a newspaper. 170 
He further emphasized that if the requirement of reasonableness and 
specificity were properly applied to the issuance of search warrants, 
there would be no opportunity for police to rummage at large through 
newspaper offices; a search would therefore not inhibit editorial or pub-
lication decisions. 171 Finally, citing Branzburg v. Hayes,172Justice 
White underscored the Court's doubts that confidential sources would 
166. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). The search warrant issued in Stanford was 
held to be the functional equivalent of a general warrant, the use of which it was the purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment to forbid. fd. at 480. Cf. note 165 supra (terms of the Fourth 
Amendment must be applied with "scrupulous exactitude" when First Amendment values 
are at stake). 
167. See, e.g., Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (obscene films); 
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961) (obscene publications). The search 
warrants in these cases were held defective because their issuance was based solely on the 
conclusory allegations of police officers, without any independent inquiry by the magistrates. 
See 392 U.S. at 637; 367 U.S. at 732. 
168. See notes 123-30 and accompanying text sup.·a. 
169. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 565. 
170. N. at 566. 
171. fd. See also id. at 565: "Properly administered, the preconditions for a war-
rant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be 
seized, and overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection against the harms 
that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices." 
l'Z2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzhurg held that the First Amendment does not afford a 
newspaper reporter a constitutional privilege against testifying before a grand jury regarding 
criminal activity he observed while performing his newsgathering function. Claims that 
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disappear or that the press would engage in self-censorship if searches 
of newspaper offices could be authorized by the issuance of warrants. 
Whatever marginal effect such searches might have on newsgathering, 
he noted, "does not make a constitutional difference in our 
judgment." 173 
The majority opinion concluded by pointing out that since the 
date of the search which gave rise to the instant action. there had been 
very few third-party searches of newspaper offices. 174 From this the 
Court inferred that law enforcement agencies were not abusing their 
power under the Fourth Amendment. 175 Any such abuses could be 
dealt with as they arose, an unlikely occurrence in the Court's view 
given the power of the press. 176 The Court also rejected the Daily's 
claim that it should have been afforded an opportunity to litigate the 
state's right to obtain the materials sought before they were seized. 177 
A subpoena requirement was not regarded as providing the press any 
greater protection than permitting searches pursuant to a warrant, since 
a showing of relevancy sufficient to support a finding of probable cause 
would, in the Court's view, also justify the issuance of a subpoena. 178 
The Court did leave open the possibility of legislative or executive ac-
tion "to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses 
forced disclosure by newspersons of confidential information or sources relating to criminal 
activity would greatly damage their effectiveness were rejected by the court. Id. at 693-99. 
173. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 566. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id.: "The press is not only an important, critical, and valuable asset to society, but it 
is not easily intimidated. . . ." 
177. Id. The majority opinion stated that "presumptively protected materials are not 
necessarily immune from seizure under warrant for use at a criminal tn.ll." Id. at 567. The 
Court found that most such seizures would not impose an unconstitutional prior restraint. 
Id. (citing Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)). 
178. 436 U.S. at 567. It should be noted, however, that with a warrant, the determination 
as to the existence of probable cause to search is made in an ex parle proceeding, whereas if 
a subpoena duces tecum is issued, the person or entity at whom it is directed will have an 
opportunity to litigate the issue of the state's entitlement to the materi.ll before it is seized. 
Thus, the opportunity to contest allegations of such entitlement may result in the quashing 
of the subpoena and the consequent preservation of the confidentiality of the material. In 
contrast, even if the validity of a search warrant can be successfully challenged, such a ruling 
can only be obtained after the material has been seized, when the hanns arising from its 
disclosure will have already occurred. See id. at 575-76 (Stewart, J., jomed by Marshall, J. 
dissenting). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
In addition, the Court noted that certain privileges against comply mg with a subpoena, 
such as those based on the Fifth Amendment or a state shield law, "are largely irrelevant to 
determining the legality of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment." 436 U.S. at 
567. Utilization of the warrant procedure therefore permits the circumvention of important 
statutory and constitutional rights. 
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of the search warrant procedure."179 
In addition to reiterating the contentions advanced and relied 
upon by the district court and adopted by the court of appeals,180 Jus-
tice Stewart's dissenting opinion made two significant observations. 
Addressing the specific facts of the case, he pointed out that no showing 
had been made by the police that there was an existing emergency situ-
ation at the time the warrant was issued, nor was the evidence sought 
contraband or any other illegal instrumentality.181 Moreover, there 
was no indication at the time the warrant was obtained that the Daily 
would not comply with a subpoena.182 Given this situation, Justice 
Stewart argued that the police should have been required to establish 
the impracticability of a subpoena bifore the magistrate authorized the 
intrusion resulting from a search pursuant to a warrant. 183 The second 
importan~ observation is Justice Stewart's contention that the First 
Amendment's specific guarantee of freedom of the press compels the 
conclusion that there is a significant difference between a search of a 
newspaper office and that of any other type of premises. 184 He found 
that the explicit constitutional protection for a free press justifies the 
rule prohibiting searches of newspaper offices pursuant to a warrant 
fashioned by the lower court. 185 
A separate dissent was filed by Justice Stevens,186wherein he ar-
gued that the Court had erred in its application of the doctrine of War-
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 570-74 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). 
181. Id. at 574-75. 
182. Id. at 575 & n.9. 
183. Id. at 575. 
184. Id. at 576. In addition to joining the majority opinion, Justice Powell wrote a sepa-
rate concurring opinion in which he challenged this aspect of Justice Stewart's dissent. Jus-
tice Powell pointed out that the Fourth Amendment was largely a response to the struggle 
between the Crown and the press. 436 U.S. at 569 (powell, J., concurring). Given this his-
tory, Justice Powell stated that if the Framers had wished to accord the press special protec-
tion against searches otherwise authorized by the Fourth Amendment, they would have 
formulated that Amendment explicitly to reflect that desire. Id. As Justice Stevens pointed 
out in his dissenting opinion, however, searches of the type carried out in the .Daily's of-
fices-those for documentary evidence-were not permitted until the Court's decision in 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 436 U.S. at 577-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 
notes 187-89 and accompanying text infra. In Justice Powell's view, First Amendment val-
ues can adequately be vindicated by a magistrate's consideration of the rights of the free 
press in connection with his determination of the reasonableness of the requested warrant. 
436 U.S. at 570 & n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). 
185. Id. at 576 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.). Justice Stewart endorsed 
the district court decision only insofar as it granted special protection to newspapers. He 
agreed with the majority that the Fourth Amendment does not generally forbid third-party 
searches. Id. at 571 n.1. 
186. Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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den v. Hayden. 187 The Court in Hayden extended the permissible scope 
of searches to include the seizure of "mere evidence," generally defined 
as documentary materials, in addition to that of the traditional objects 
of a search: contrabarid, weapons and plunder. 188 Justice Stevens 
noted that the pre-Hayden limitation on the permissible objects of a 
search had had the effect of restricting the category of persons who 
could properly be subjected to a search. 189 By permitting the seizure of 
documentary evidence of crime, the Hayden decision greatly expanded 
the number of persons whose privacy interests could be infringed by 
such searches. Where the object of the search is contraband or the 
fruits of crime, Justice Stevens found it reasonable to infer that the pos-
sessor is involved in criminal activity and that if given prior notice of 
the search will dispose of the evidence. 19o In such cases a showing of 
probable cause to believe that the individual is in fact in possession of 
such objects justifies the invasion of privacy. 191 But where mere docu-
mentary evidence, such as that sought from the Sta'!fi-,rd .Daily, is in-
volved, the custodian is much less likely to be guilty of criminal 
wrongdoing and is more likely to honor a subpoena or informal request 
to produce the material. 192 In such cases, Justice Stevens contended 
that the probable cause standard can only be satisfied by a showing that 
the subject of the search is involved in criminal activity or, if given 
notice, will conceal or destroy the evidence. 193 Since no such showing 
was made in the warrant application in Zurcher, Justice Stevens would 
have held that the search of the .Daily offices was unreasonable and 
therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. 194 
2. Analysis 
In order better to analyze the Court's decision in Zurcher, consid-
eration of the case will be trisected. The first section will examine the 
validity of the Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment does not 
grant special protection to non-culpable third-party possessors of evi-
dence sought by law enforcement agencies. The second section will 
evaluate the necessity of using search warrants rather than subpoenas. 
The third section will scrutinize the possible harm to the press that may 
187. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
188. Id. at 300-10. 
189. 436 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
190. N. at 581. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 582-83. 
194. Id. at 583. 
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arise in the wake of Zurcher. The potential for legislative or executive 
action to bolster the First Amendment guarantees potentially 
threatened by the decision will also be discussed. 
Before embarking on this specific analysis, however, it is important 
to make one general observation regarding the contrast between the 
approach taken by a majority of the Supreme Court in Zurcher and 
that adopted by the district court and echoed by several justices who 
dissented from the Court's decision. The crucial difference is that a 
majority of the Supreme Court treated Zurcher essentially as a case 
posing issues relating to the construction and application of the Fourth 
Amendment. Consequently, the First Amendment issues were given 
secondary importance by the Court. In contrast, the district court and 
several dissenters on the Supreme Court focused directly on the First 
Amendment implications of a search of a newspaper office. The 
Zurcher majority first inquired whether or not the state had a valid 
interest in and probable cause to conduct the search. Once that was 
established, the Court required only that the warrant requirements be 
applied with "scrupulous exactitude" when the premises to be searched 
are a newspaper office. 195 Conversely, the district court and Justices 
Stewart and Marshall looked first to the Stanford .Daily's rights under 
the First Amendment and then sought to weigh those rights against the 
state's interest in obtaining the materials. Finding that the state had 
failed to show that the evidence sought could not be obtained in a less 
intrusive manner than by a search pursuant to a warrant, the district 
court and these dissenters urged that an appropriate balancing of inter-
ests could best be struck by limiting the use of search warrants against 
newspapers to those instances where a subpoena duces tecum would be 
impracticable. 196 
a. The Court's Interpretation 0/ the Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court based its rejection of the district court's inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment on a number of grounds, each of 
which merits examination. The first was that nothing in the language 
of the Fourth Amendment precludes the issuance of third-party search 
warrants. The Court rejected as inapposite the authorities relied upon 
by the district court197 and founded its own view on language in United 
States v. Kahn 198 which suggested that search warrants are not directed 
195. Id. at 564 (majority opinion). See text accompanying note 169 supra. 
196. 436 U.S. at 575 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). 
197. Id. at 554. See note 137 and accompanying text supra. 
198. 415 U.S. 143 (1974). 
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at persons but rather at "places" and "thingS."199 The inference the 
Court appeared to draw from Kahn was that the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment are satisfied, even where the person or persons at 
whom the search is directed are not specified, when probable cause for 
the search is demonstrated.2°O Although the Court's reliance on Kahn 
may not have been well founded,201 it is the summary rejection of the 
authorities cited by the district court that requires closer examination. 
The Court's rejection of the four state cases cited in the district 
court opinion202 is understandable in light of its ruling in Warden v. 
Hayden203 that "mere evidence" can properly be the object of a 
search.204 Since the cases relied upon by the lower court were pre-
Hayden decisions which did not address the specific question of 
whether the issuance of a subpoena is a preferable alternative to the use 
of a search warrant, they were properly held inapposite by the Supreme 
Court. The same cannot be said for the Court's rejection of the district 
court's argument by analogy to Bacon v. United States.205 In Bacon the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the issuance of a warrant for the 
arrest of a material witness invalid for failure to establish probable 
cause to believe that securing the witness's presence by means of sub-
poena would be impracticapo6 The district court in Zurcher accepted 
the Daily's argument that "if one not suspected of a crime cannot be 
arrested unless there is a showing that subpoena is impracticable, one 
not suspected of a crime cannot be searched unless there is a showing 
199. Id. at 155 n.15. 
200. 436 U.S. at 555. 
201. A careful reading of the cited footnote in Kahn makes the Court's reliance on it 
questionable. Kahn dealt with the question of whether the wiretapped conversations of a 
person not named in the application seeking authorization for the wiretap could subse-
quently be used as evidence to prosecute the subject of the tap. But the b.lsis for the decision 
in Kahn was the Court's construction of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976); it did not rest upon constitutional 
grounds. See 415 U.S. at 150, 152-55. The footnote cited by the Court in Zurcher was 
therefore merely dicta. Further, the Kahn Court stated in the same footnote that "even a 
warrant failing to name the owner of the premises at which a search is dIrected, while not the 
best practice, has been held to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 155 n.15 
(emphasis added). It thus appears that while search warrants which do not specify the per-
son from whom the material is to be seized are permissible, the Court \0 Kahn did attach 
some importance to naming the party whose premises are to be searched, an emphasis not 
reflected in the Zurcher Court's reference to Kahn. 
202. Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 
567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895); People v. Carver, 172 Misc. 820, 16 N.Y.S.2d 268 (County Ct. 
1939); Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923). 
203. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
204. Id. at 301-02. 
205. 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971). 
206. Id. at 943. 
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that a subpoena duces tecum is impracticable."207 In response to the 
argument that Bacon dealt only with the issue of permissible grounds 
for an arrest and was not a search and seizure case, the district court 
replied: "But historically the right against unlawful seizures has if any-
thing been more protected, not less protected, than the right against 
unlawful arrests."208 The argument by analogy to Bacon was deem~d 
strong enough by the district court, and subsequently by the court of 
appeals, to compel the conclusion that no search warrant can issue 
against a third party unless the state shows that resort to a subpoena is 
impracticapo9 Given this heavy reliance on Bacon, it would appear 
that the case merited greater attention from the Supreme Court than its 
summary treatment in a footnote.210 
The second ground relied upon by the Supreme Court in reversing 
the district court decision was that the culpability of the third-party 
property holder is immaterial to the state's interest in enforcing its 
criminal law and recovering evidence of crime.2ll The Court bolstered 
this contention by reference to Camara v. Municipal CourP12 and qee v. 
City of Seattle.213 The applicability of Camara and See in the factual 
context of Zurcher is questionable for several reasons. First, at least 
insofar as Camara is concerned, it is not at all clear that the culpability 
of the property holder was not a factor in the Court's decision.214 Sec-
ondly, neither of these cases arose initially out of situations involving 
the issuance of search warrants. The common issue in Camara and See 
was whether city health and fire inspectors could enter private premises 
without judicial authorization for the purpose of conducting inspec-
tions to determine compliance with municipal ordinances. Petitioners 
207. 353 F. Supp. at 129 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). 
208. Id. at 130 (emphasis in the original) (citing Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-
Man's Land in Criminal Law, 49 CAL. L. REV. 474 (1961); Orfield, Warrant of Arrest in 
Summons upon Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure, 27 U. CIN. L. REV. I (1958». De-
fendants had also attempted to distinguish Bacon on the ground that it was based on 18 
U.S.C. § 3149 (1976) and Rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than 
the Fourth Amendment. See 353 F. Supp. at 129. The district court ruled, however, that the 
procedures set out in the Federal Rules are mandated by the Fourth Amendment. Id. (cit-
ing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 
(1958». 
209. 353 F. Supp. at 130. 
210. Justice White rejected the applicability of Bacon because "that case dealt with arrest 
of a material witness and is unpersuasive with respect to the search for criminal evidence." 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 554 n.5. 
211. Id. at 555. 
212. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
213. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
214. See note 152 supra. 
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in both cases insisted that the inspectors obtain search warrants before 
they would grant them permission to enter. The Supreme Court subse-
quently vindicated their claims, holding that a search warrant is re-
quired for such inspections. 
Since search warrants were required in Camara and See regardless 
of the culpability of the property-holders there, the Zurcher Court 
seemed to infer that the same rule should hold true in the case before it. 
The difficulty with this analysis is that in Camara and See there existed 
no less burdensome alternative to the use of a search warrant, while 
there was such an alternative in Zurcher. The only viable method for 
inspecting a personal residence or business premises is by a search. 
The same is not true in situations such as that presented in Zurcher, 
where the magistrate could have issued a subpoena for the desired 
materials and thereby accomplished their acquisition. In view of the 
Court's apparent unwillingness to consider the district court's analysis 
based on its analogy to Bacon,21S it seems inconsistent for the Court to 
have relied on such distinguishable cases as Camara and See. 
An additional problem with the majority's discussion of the culpa-
bility question is its failure to squarely address two arguments made by 
the lower court. The district court stated that "as a historical matter the 
notion of search warrants has involved only those suspected of a 
crime."216 It was perhaps in response to this obsen'ation that the 
Supreme Court presented its analysis of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure to show that considerations relating to searches 
and seizures are separate and distinct from arrest procedures.217 If so, 
the Court missed the thrust of the district court's argument. The lower 
court only felt that in light of the historical limitation on the use of 
search warrants to those suspected of crime, a less burdensome alterna-
tive that could achieve the same results should be utilized to obtain 
evidence from innocent third parties.218 
The district court also noted that the practice of issuing search 
215. See notes 205-10 and accompanying text supra. 
216. 353 F. Supp. at 131. In support of this contention, the district C,)urt cited Henry v. 
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 
1930) (opinion of Learned Hand, J.); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in 
Criminal Law, 49 CAL. L. REV. 474, 475-77 (1961). 
217. See 436 U.S. at 558-59 (citing ALI, A MODEL CODE OF RE-ARR \lGNMENT PROCE-
DURE, COMMENTARY 491 (Proposed Off. Draft 1975». See also United States v. Manufac-
turers Nat'l Bank, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (1976), cerl. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United States, 
429 U.S. 1039 (1977). See text accompanying note 157 supra. 
218. q. 436 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (where the obje.::t of a search is an 
innocent third party, probable cause can only be established by a showing that ifnotice were 
given, he would conceal or destroy the evidence sought). 
Fall 1978] CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 51 
warrants without regard to the culpability of the person at whom the 
search is directed results in the inequitable treatment of innocent third 
parties. Whereas the exclusionary rule is available to vindicate the 
rights of criminal defendants, "[a] third-party ... does not have the 
protection or deterrent of the exclusionary rule, for by definition he is 
not about to be tried for a crime."219 Consequently, the district court 
held that in the case of an innocent third party, "an additional safe-
guard is necessary to assure that his Fourth Amendment rights are not 
trampled. That protection is the obligation oflaw enforcement to use a 
subpoena duces tecum unless it is shown, through sworn affidavits, that 
it is impractical to do SO."220 
Justice White was unpersuaded as to the necessity of this addi-
tional requirement. He asserted that the existing provisions and inter-
pretations of the Fourth Amendment constitute an adequate balancing 
of the individual's right of privacy against the public need, regardless 
of whether a subpoena duces tecum is a less intrusive alternative.221 
The majority went further in rejecting the need for additional Fourth 
Amendment protections, relying on the reasoning of the Court's opin-
ion in Alderman v. United States222 to conclude that "the interest in 
deterring illegal third-party searches does not justify a rule such as that 
adopted by the District Court."223 The majority also stated that "it 
would be placing the cart before the horse to prohibit searches other-
wise conforming to the Fourth Amendment because of a perception 
that the deterrence provided by the existing rules of standing is insuffi-
cient to discourage illegal searches."224 Finally, the district court was 
chastised for having overlooked the-California Supreme Court's previ-
219. 353 F. Supp. at 132. 
220. Id. (footnote omitted). 
221. 436 U.S. at 559. 
222. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman, Justice White, writing for a majority of the 
Court, noted that "[t]he established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth 
Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by 
the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging 
evidence." Id. at 171-72. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963); 
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942). He went on to state that "[w]e adhere 
to ... the general rule that Fourth Amendment right; are personal rights which, like some 
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." 394 U.S. at 174. See Simmons 
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-61 
(1960). 
223. 436 U.S. at 562 n.9. The Court in Alderman had ruled that the additional deterrent 
effect of extending the exclusionary rule did not 'Justify further encroachment upon the 
public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted 
on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." 394 U.S. at 175. 
224. 436 U.S. at 562-63 n.9 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967». 
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ous ruling in Kaplan v. Superior CourP25 that the legality of a search 
and seizure can be challenged by anyone against whom the evidence 
obtained is used, regardless of whether his own Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated. In this vein, however, the Zurcher Court failed to 
recognize the apparent inconsistency between its views and the reason-
ing underlying Kaplan. In extending the applicability of the exclusion-
ary rule beyond the parameters delineated in Alderman. the California 
Supreme Court in Kaplan reaffirmed its position that" 'if law enforce-
ment officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining 
evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is 
to that extent nullified. Moreover, such a limitation virtually invites 
law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties. . . .' "226 
But it was left unclear by the Supreme Court in Zurcher how Califor-
nia law would provide any protection for the rights of the Stanford 
Daily and its staff in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
brought in federal court under a federal statute.227 If .Kaplan grants the 
Daily no substantive rights, its very inapplicability together with its ra-
tionale would seem to support the district court's perception that addi-
tional Fourth Amendment protections are required for third-party 
searches. Thus, the Zurcher majority's reference to Aaplan does not 
resolve the question of the need for additional protections, but rather 
serves to call attention to the differing views of the United States and 
California Supreme Courts. 
b. The State's Interest-The Necessity of Search Warrallts 
One basis for the district court's holding was its belief that requir-
ing a subpoena for most third-party searches would not substantially 
impede criminal investigations. A majority of the Supreme Court 
found, however, that the state's interest in efficient and successful law 
enforcement would be seriously dis served if the use of search warrants 
was limited as provided under the lower court opinion. Two hypotheti-
cal examples of this undermining influence were advanced in the body 
of the majority opinion, with a third possibility discussed in a foot-
note.228 Because search warrants are frequently employed early in an 
investigation, the Court suggested that the "seemingly blameless" third 
party who possesses the evidence may not tum out to be innocent after 
225. 6 Cal. 3d 150,491 P.2d I, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971). 
226. 6 Cal. at 157,491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (quoting Peopl.:: v. Martin, 45 Cal. 
2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 860 (1955». 
227. The action in Zurcher was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 
122 supra. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). 
228. 436 U.S. at 561 & n.8. 
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aU-and even if not directly culpable might still not be relied upon to 
surrender evidence which implicates his friends.229 As a corollary to 
this possibility, Justice White stated that "it is likely that the real cul-
prits will have access to the property, and the delay involved in em-
ploying the subpoena duces tecum . . . could easily result in the 
disappearance of the evidence."23o Finally, it was suggested in a foot-
note that the use of a subpoena would allow the recipient to interpose a 
Fifth Amendment challenge to the request, and that the resultant litiga-
tion could "seriously impede criminal investigations."231 
The Court's concern regarding the first two problems is unsup-
ported either by authority or specific examples indicating the extent to 
which such problems have occurred in the past. As Justice Stevens 
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, prior to the change brought about 
by the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden,232 documentary evidence 
was routinely obtained by subpoena.233 This procedure assumed that 
the person in possession of the evidence would honor the subpoena, 
and the Zurcher majority did not question its effectiveness. Moreover, 
the Court's assertion that problems of preserving evidence would occur 
and thereby hamper law enforcement efforts is not supported by the 
facts in Zurcher. As the district court pointed out, "[t]here was no hint 
whatsoever that the sought after materials would be destroyed or re-
moved from the jurisdiction."234 Although the Daily apparently had 
announced a policy of destroying any photographs that might implicate 
the protesters,235 there is no evidence that such a destruction took place 
and the majority did not cite this policy in support of its holding. Even 
if it could be assumed that the Daily would not have preserved evi-
dence of the assault on the police, it is unlikely that the same problem 
would arise in other factual contexts. It is difficult to believe, for exam-
ple, that when a member of a newspaper staff photographs a bank rob-
bery, he will return the incriminating photographs to the bank robbers. 
And it can be assumed that third parties will generally not act so as to 
impede criminal investigations. Yet this is what the unqualified lan-
guage in Zurcher appears to suggest. 
The third impediment to law enforcement efforts said to arise from 
the enforced use of the subpoena procedure-that challenges to the va-
229. Id. at 561. 
230. £d. 
231. £d. at 561-62 n.8. 
232. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See notes 187-89 and accompanying text supra. 
23,3. 436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
234. 353 F. Supp. at 129 n.2. 
235. 436 U.S. at 568 n.l (powell, J., concurring). 
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lidity of subpoenas on Fifth Amendment grounds could be interposed 
and would slow investigations-is similarly based on conjecture and 
unsupported by authority. It seems doubtful that a third party would 
object to a subpoena merely out of a desire not to cooperate with the 
authorities. After all, such a course of conduct might result in the po-
lice focusing their attention on an individual previously believed inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. And if the possessor of the evidence does have 
a valid Fifth Amendment claim, there is no reason why he should not 
be given an opportunity to assert it. Given the speculatiye nature of the 
other problems cited by the Court, it is questionable whether this addi-
tional concern justifies the Court's endorsement of the belief that "the 
warranted search is necessary to secure and to avoid the destruction of 
evidence. "236 
c. The Impact of Zurcher on First Amendment Guarantees 
At the root of the decision in Zurcher is the belief on the part of 
the majority that searches authorized by warrants, when properly con-
ducted, will not significantly impinge on the functioning of a free 
press.237 This belief and the specific conclusions derived therefrom by 
the Court were challenged in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, in 
which Justice Marshall joined. Although he agreed with the majority's 
conclusion as to the permissibility of third-party searches under the 
Fourth Amendment,238 Justice Stewart argued that the First Amend-
ment's express grant of protection to the press justifies requiring the use 
of a subpoena rather than a search warrant when the possessor of the 
evidence is a newspaper. He found it "self-evident that police searches 
of newspaper offices burden the freedom of the press,"239 pointing out 
that such searches can be lengthy and disruptive240 and would neces-
sarily entail police examination of materials obtained from informers 
and other confidential sources-a prospect which could compel the 
newspaper to engage in self-censorship.241 
Regarding the detrimental effect such searches would have on the 
vital confidential relationships developed by reporters, Justice Stewart 
236. Id. at 563 (footnote omitted). 
237. See notes 164-73 and accompanying text supra. 
238. 436 U.S. at 571 n.1 (Stewart, J.,joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). 
239. £d. at 571. 
240. Se~ e.g., Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory. Fourth Amendment 
and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957-59 (1976) (describing one search 
of a Los Angeles radio station that lasted over eight hours). 
241. 436 U.S. at 573 n.6 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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distinguished the ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes,242 relied on by the ma-
jority,243 from the instant case. He pointed out that whereas Branzburg 
dealt with "the more limited disclosure of a journalist's sources caused 
by compelling him to testify,"244 the question in Zurcher was not 
whether there is an absolute First Amendment privilege against disclo-
sure, but rather what is the most appropriate and least burdensome 
means of acquiring relevant evidence from a newspaper.245 After re-
viewing the circumstances leading to the issuance of the search war-
rant,246 he concluded that no impediment to law enforcement had been 
demonstrated in Zurcher, but that there was a great potential for harm 
in the wake of the majority's decision.247 
Media concern over the impact of the Zurcher decision may be 
lessened if the legislature or the executive branch acts on the invitation 
extended by the majority to enact suitable safeguards against abuses of 
discretion in the issuance of search warrants directed at newspapers.248 
II. The Broadcast Media and the First Amendment: Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation 
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pac!fica Foundation,249 
the United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has statutory and 
constitutional authority to impose sanctions for the broadcasting oflan-
guage which, although not obscene, can be characterized as "indecent" 
and "patently offensive" when broadcast at a time when children are 
likely to be in the listening audience.25o In resolving this question, the 
Court considered whether non-obscene speech can properly be re-
242. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
243. See note 172 and accompanying text supra. 
244. 436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). 
245. Id. 
246. See notes 181 & 182 and accompanying text supra. 
247. 436 U.S. at 572-74 & n.8. Justice Stewart's concern over the effect the Zurcher deci-
sion will have on the press has been echoed by representatives of the mass media since the 
decision was handed down. See, e.g., Javoslovsky, Police in the Newsroom: The Sta'!fOrd 
Case, Wall St. J., June 20, 1978, at 20, cols. 4-6; Wall St. J., June 13, 1978, at 24, cols. 1-2; 
S.F. Chronicle, June 27, 1978, at II, ools. 2-5. 
248. See note 179 and accompanying text supra. 
249. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978). 
250. For discussions of the FCC's power to regulate obscene language, see generally, 
Comment, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Communications Commission and 
Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 457 (1974); Note, Morality and the Broadcast 
Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV. 664 
(1971); Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast 
Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579 (1975); Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 
1343 (1970). 
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stricted as to the time, place and manner of its dissemination, and also 
whether a distinction can constitutionally be drawn between "indecent" 
and "obscene" language. 
A. The Decision 
In the early afternoon of October 30, 1973, a man and his young 
son were driving in New York City and listening to Station WBAI, 
licensed to the Pacifica Foundation. A comedy monologue by satirist 
George Carlin was being broadcast as part of a regularly scheduled live 
program, "Lunchpail," whose subject that day was an analysis of atti-
tudes towards language held by contemporary society. The mono-
logue, entitled "Filthy Words," was originally delivered before a live 
theatre audience, and sought to ridicule societal restrictions on the use 
of certain words, especially over the airways.251 The father subsequent-
ly filed a complaint with the FCC stating that the airing of the mono-
logue during a time when children were likely to be listening should 
not have been permitted. 
On February 21, 1975, the Commission responded to the com-
plaint by issuing a Memorandum Opinion and Declaratory Order 
granting the complaint and holding that Pacifica "could have been the 
subject of administrative sanctions" for the broadcast.25:! The Commis-
sion derived its authority to regulate indecent broadcasting from 18 
U.S.c. § 1464, which specifically prohibits "obscene, indecent or pro-
251. "Filthy Words" is a monologue from the live album "George Carlin, Occupation: 
Foole," by Little David Records. A transcript of the monologue is appended to the decision 
of the Supreme Court, 98 S. Ct. at 3041-43. The words identified by the satirist were "shit," 
"piss," "fuck," "cunt," "cocksucker," "motherfucker" and "tits." The) were not meant by 
him to comprise an exhaustive list; to the "original seven" words, Carlin would add "fart, 
turd, and twat." 98 S. Ct. at 3043. Although the FCC did not consider these additions to the 
list in its opinion, holding only that the broadcast of the "original seven" was indecent, 56 
F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), sanctions presumably could be imposed by the Commission in the 
future should it be determined that "fart, turd, and twat" are indecent as well. Other words 
might well be considered. For example, Georgia state Senator Julian Bond and the NAACP 
have filed suit with the FCC seeking to have the word "nigger" add.:d to the list. S.F. 
Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1978 (World), at 27. 
252. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975). The Commission declined to impose tbrmal sanctions on 
Pacifica, noting instead that the Order would be "associated with the s\Jtion's license file," 
id., and would be considered in the event subsequent complaints were filed. Under 47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1970), the Commission is empowered to impose forfeitures for violations 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). See note 253 i'!fra. Specifically: "(1) Any licensee or permittee 
of a broadcast station who. . . (E) violates section. . . 1464 of Title 1 S. shall forfeit to the 
United States a sum not to exceed $1000. Each day during which such \ 101ation occurs shall 
constitute a separate offense. Such forfeiture shall be in addition to an:- other penalty pro-
vided by this chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1970). 
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fane language,"253 and from 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) which generally re-
quires the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use 
of radio in the public interest."254 In reaching its determination that 
the Carlin monologue was indecent, the Commission first observed that 
the broadcast medium has special qualities of intrusiveness which re-
quire a different standard of analysis than is normally applied to other, 
less intrusive forms of expression.255 Particularly important to the 
Commission was the possibility, recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Miller v. Cal!fomia,256 that inherent in the broadcasting medium is" 'a 
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients 
or of exposure to juveniles.' "257 
Turning to the definition of "indecent," the Commission explained 
that, in its view, the term was not subsumed under the concept of ob-
scenity, but was instead subject to an independent definition.258 In re-
formulating the definition of "indecent" under section 1464,259 the 
253. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94 n.lo 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) provides in full: "Whoever utters 
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." The Commission 
had previously defined "indecent" to mean material that is "(a) patently offensive by con-
temporary community standards; and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value." East-
ern Educ. Radio (WUHy), 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970). 
254. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94 n.lo 47 U.S.c. § 303(g) (1970) outlines the general powers and 
duties of the Commission. 
255. 56 F.C.C.2d at 96-97. The Commission advanced four considerations in support of 
its view that a different standard of analysis is required for the broadcast media: "(I) 
[Clhildren have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio 
receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy interest is entitled to extra defer-
ence, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); (3) unconsenting adults may tune 
in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and 
(4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must therefore 
license in the public interest." I d. at 97. 
256. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See note 278 infta. 
257. 56 F.C.C.2d at 97 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 19). 
258. 56 F.C.C.3d at 97. The Commission cited three federal circuit court of appeals deci-
sions in support of its position: United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972) (term 
"indecent" not necessarily included within definition of "obscene" and should be defined on 
retrial); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972) ("indecent" not defined by 
court, but no prejudice to defendant where he was prosecuted only for using "obscene" 
language); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966) (held reversible error 
where trial court did not issue jury instructions defining the term "indecent"). 
Although no court had previously defined "indecent" under § 1464, the Commission 
itself had, prior to Miller v. California, defined the term to mean that "the material broad-
cast is (a) patently offensive by contemporary standards; and (b) is utterly without redeem-
ing social value." Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHy), 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970). Inasmuch as 
this definition was tied to the then existing obscenity standard, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966), the Supreme Court's adoption of a new obscenity test in Miller 
required the Commission to update its definition of "indecent." 
259. See note 258 supra. 
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Commission drew from the law of public nuisance.26o Under nuisance 
law, behavior is generally channelled rather than prohibited. Thus, the 
Commission defined "indecent" to mean "language that describes, in 
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and 
organs, at times 0/ the day when there is a reasonable rb* that children 
may be in the audience."261 Although the Commission did not impose 
sanctions on the Pacifica Foundation, this new definition of "indecent" 
would, in future cases, allow the Commission to enforce its conviction 
that "such words [as the seven in the Carlin broadcast] are indecent 
within the meaning of the statute and have no place on radio when 
children are in the audience."262 
In addition to the majority opinion, three concurring statements 
were filed. Commissioner Reid approved of the majority viewpoint but 
felt that it did not go far enough. In her opinion the indecent language 
of the monologue was inappropriate for broadcast at any time, whether 
night or day.263 Whereas the Commission sought to channel broad-
casts so as to limit possible exposure to children, Commissioner Reid 
would have prohibited indecent language from being broadcast at any 
time.264 This view was shared by Commissioner Quello. who noted his 
support succinctly: "Garbage is garbage. . . . I believe such words are 
reprehensive no matter what the broadcast hour."265 
260. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission cited two federal decisions dealing with public 
nuisance statutes as examples of the principles supporting its new cont""tual definition of 
"indecent." See Von Sleichter v. United States, 472 F.2d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Williams v. 
District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc). For criticIsm of the Commis-
sion's "nuisance" theory, see Chief Judge Bazelon's statement in favor of granting a rehear-
ing en banc in Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcast v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418-19 n.48 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See also, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 19 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring). On the use of nuisance analysis as a method of regulating ob-
scenity, see generally, Note, Porno Non Est Pro Bono Publico: Obscenity as a Public Nuisance 
in California, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1977); Note, Restricting th.' Public .Display of 
Ojfensive Materials: The Use and Ejfectiveness of Public and Private Nuisance Actions, 10 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 232 (1975). 
261. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (emphasis added). 
262. Id. The Commission noted that a different standard for defining "indecent" might 
conceivably be used in the late evening hours when few children are in the audience. The 
definition would remain the same insofar as the language was concerned. I:e., words which 
are patently offensive as measured by the contemporary community stand.lrds for the broad-
cast medium would remain prohibited. However, the Commission wt.'uld also consider 
whether these late-evening expressions had serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973»). 
263. 56 F.C.C.2d at 102 (Reid, Comm'r., concurring). 
264. Id. See notes 260-61 and accompanying text supra. 
265. 56 F.C.C.2d at 103 (Queilo, Comm'r., concurring). 
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Commissioner Robinson, joined by Commissioner Hook, con-
curred in the issuance of the order, but offered a more extensive review 
of the problems courts have faced in attempting to define the terms 
"obscene" and "indecent."266 He noted that the "'core prob-
lem'-what constitutes obscenity-has never been satisfactorily unrav-
eled."267 He noted as well that "people do not have an unlimited right 
to avoid exposure to [obscenity]."268 In the view of Commissioners 
Robinson and Hook, the Commission's decision, embracing a "nui-
sance" analysis, adopted a limited but pragmatic approach to accom-
modating the interests protected by the First Amendment and the 
interests of the public in having the young protected from exposure to 
inappropriate language. 
Shortly after the issuance of the order, the Radio Television News 
Directors Association (RTNDA) petitioned the Commission for clarifi-
cation of the standards for determining indecency,269 The RTNDA 
was concerned that the order would expose its members to the threat of 
sanctions when "indecent" words were uttered in the context of bona 
fide news or public affairs programs. The Commission reaffirmed its 
earlier decision, however, stressing that the order was issued in a spe-
cific factual context and was based primarily on the need to protect 
young children from sexually explicit language,27o The Commission 
refused to comment on the hypothetical situations posed by the 
RTNDA and reiterated its conclusion that such language could only be 
broadcast, if at all, during the late evening hours,271 
Following an appeal by the Pacifica Foundation, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed the Commission,272 Circuit 
Judge Tamm held that the order was issued in violation of the prohibi-
tion against censorship contained in 47 U.S.C. § 326,273 and that even if 
266. Id. at 103 (Robinson, Comm'r., joined by Hook, Comm'r., concurring). 
267. Id. at 104 (citing Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitu-
tionallssue-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961)). 
268. 56 F.C.C.2d at 106 (Robinson, Comm'r., joined by Hook, Comm'r., concurring). 
269. 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976). 
270. Id. at 893. 
271. Id. 
272. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Chief Judge Baze10n and 
Circuit Judge Tamm filed separate opinions in favor of reversal; a dissenting opinion was 
entered by Circuit Judge Leventhal. For discussions of the Court of Appeals decision, see 
Note, Pac!fica Foundation v. FCC- "Filthy Words.," the First Amendment and the Broadcast 
Media, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 164 (1978); Note, Constitutional Law-Pac!fica Foundation v. 
FCC: First Amendment Limitations on FCC Regulation of Offensive Broadcasts, 56 N.C.L. 
REV. 584 (1978). 
273. 556 F.2d at 18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be 
understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio 
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the Commission had the authority to regulate non-obscene speech, the 
text of its order would have been subject to reversal on the grounds of 
vagueness and overbreadth.274 The court of appeals was thus able to 
reverse the Commission on grounds which circumvented the need to 
define "indecent" under section 1464. 
Chief Judge Bazelon concurred with the result reached by Judge 
Tamm, but felt that the protections against censorship provided by sec-
tion 326 were not absolute because the terms of section 1464 authorized 
criminal punishment for anyone uttering "obscene, indecent, or pro-
. fane" language over the radio.275 Whereas Judge Tamm believed sec-
tion 326 to be dispositive, Chief Judge Bazelon reformulated the issues 
to focus first on whether the Carlin monlogue would be protected by 
the First Amendment if disseminated by any other medium, a.nd sec-
ond whether the unique characteristics of broadcasting justified an ex-
pansion of governmental regulation of speech.276 He concluded that 
the Commission's definition of "indecency" was prima facie unconsti-
tutionaP77 Citing the strict standard for obscenity set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Miller v. Caltfornia,278 Chief Judge Bazelon found 
the order to be an overbroad, distorted interpretation of those 
guidelines.279 
Examining the four circumstances claimed by the Commission to 
justify special regulation of speech disseminated over the broadcast me-
dium,280 Chief Judge Bazelon rejected the contention that the broad-
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition 
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere \\ Ith the right of free 
speech by means of radio communication." 
In reversing the Commission, Judge Tamm stated his view that "[ajny examination of 
thought or expression in order to prevent publication of objectionable material is censor-
ship." 556 F.2d at 14. 
274. Judge Tamm found the order to be vague because it lacked a defi.nition of children, 
id. at 17, and that it was overbroad in that it prohibited the use of the se\<:n indecent words 
in any context. Id. 
275. See note 253 and accompanying text supra. 
276. 556 F.2d at 20 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). 
277. Id. at 23. 
278. 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). In rejecting as the constitutional standard the "uller/y with-
out redeeming social value" test articulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 
(1966) (emphasis in original), the Court in Miller set forth the following basic guidelines: 
"(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find 
that the work, taken as a whole; appeals to the prurient interest ... ; (bl whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value." 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). 
279. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). 
280. See note 255 supra. 
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casting of offensive speech may offend the privacy interests of 
nonconsenting adults in their homes. Relying on the Supreme Court 
decisions in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,281 Cohen v. Cal!fornia,282 
and Rowan v. Post Office Department,283 he reasoned that the radio lis-
tener "can avert his attention by changing channels or turning off the 
set."284 The Commission's argument that the presence of children in 
the listening audience justifies increased government regulation of 
broadcast speech was also rejected on the ground that individual pa-
rental control is preferable to state action in loco parentis.285 Chief 
Judge Bazelon concluded his concurring opinion by expressing disa-
greement with the contention that the scarcity of broadcasting frequen-
cies and other considerations warranted the order promulgated by the 
Commission.286 
Circuit Judge Leventhal dissented and expressed his support for 
the order. He argued that its definition of "indecent" was "a functional 
equivalent to the Supreme Court's current 'obscenity' ruling 
(Miller),"287 and that the time and place restrictions of the order were a 
reasonable "constitutional trade-off."288 Unlike Judge Tamm289 and 
Chief Judge Bazelon,290 Judge Leventhal did not find the order over-
broad since, in his view, it was carefully limited by the Commission to 
prohibit only the broadcasting of indecent language during the after-
noon.291 Nor, despite "some inexactness in the agency's approach," did 
Judge Leventhal find the order void for vagueness.292 
281. 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (limited privacy interests of persons on public street cannot 
justify censorship of otherwise protected speech). ' 
282. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (absent particularized and compelling reasons, state may not 
make public display of four-letter expletive a criminal offense). 
283. 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (approval given to statutory scheme permitting addressee to 
give notice that he wishes no further mailings from specific sender of erotic or sexually 
provocative matter). 
284. 556 F.2d at 26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Bazelon also found that 
people's privacy interests in their homes are reduced when they open up their home by 
turning on the radio. Id. at 27. 
285. Id. at 27-29. 
286. Id. at 29. Chief Judge Bazelon believed that Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
395 U.S. 367 (1969), did not support the Commission's spectrum space arguments since un-
like Red Lion, where the FCC's fairness doctrine raised questions of broadcast freedom and 
public access to varied viewpoints, the instant case presented no divergence of First Amend-
ment interests. 
287. 556 F.2d at 32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). 
288. Id. at 37. 
289. Id. at 16-17. 
290. Id. at 21 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). 
291. Id. at 36 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). 
292. Id. at 35. 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari,293 and in a five-four deci-
sion294 reversed the court of appeals on both statutory and constitu-
tional grounds. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first 
determined that in issuing its order, the Commission had not engaged 
in formal rulemaking or the promulgation of regulations. Rather, the 
Commission had simply adjudicated a dispute limited to the mono-
logue "as broadcast" under 5 U.S.c. § 554(c).295 This initial determi-
nation not only permitted the Court to avoid issuing an advisory 
opinion, but also served to focus attention on the precise factual context 
underlying the Pac!fica litigation. 
The Court analyzed the legislative purpose underlying section 
326296 and section 1464,297 and concluded that the prohibition against 
censorship contained in section 326 does not so limit section 1464 as to 
prevent the Commission from applying administrative sanctions 
against licensees who "engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broad-
casting.,,298 Justice Stevens next addressed the question of whether the 
afternoon broadcast of the Carlin monologue was indecent within the 
meaning of section 1464. Examining the language of the statute, he 
reasoned that the words "obscene, indecent, or profane," are used in 
the disjunctive and inferred that each word was intended to have a 
separate and distinct meaning. Thus, the fact that the Carlin mono-
logue lacked prurient appeal and was therefore not obscene under 
Miller299 did not preclude its being indecent under section 1464. 
The Court rejected Pacifica's contention that the term "indecent" 
in section 1464 should be interpreted in the same manner as it is under 
18 U.S.C. § 1461. Section 1461 prohibits the use of the United States 
mails to disseminate, inter alia, obscene and indecent matter.3OO The 
293. 434 U.S. 1008 (1978). 
294. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Powell (Parts I. II, III & IV(C)), 
and an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined (Parts IV(A) & 
IV(B)). Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Blackmunjoined. Justice 
Brennan,joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Stewart filed a sepa-
rate dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, White and Marshall joined. 
295. Id. at 3032. Section 554(e) provides: "The agency, with like effect as in the case of 
other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a con-
troversy or remove uncertainty." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1976). 
296. See note 273 supra. 
297. See note 253 supra. 
298. 98 S. Ct. at 3035. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two sections, now 
separate, had together previously formed § 29 of the Radio Act of 1927. 
299. See note 278 supra. . 
300. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). Pacifica argued that the Court's interpretation of§ 1461 in 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), which had subsumed "indecent" under the 
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two statutes were distinguished on the basis of their subject matter; sec-
tion 1461 involves printed matter whereas section 1464 relates solely to 
broadcasting. Finding no controlling definition of "indecent," Justice 
Stevens concluded that there was no basis for disagreeing with the 
Commission's determination that the language used in the afternoon 
broadcast was indecent and therefore subject to sanction.30 ! 
Having resolved the statutory issues, Justice Stevens' opinion 
turned to the constitutional challenges raised by Pacifica. This section 
of the opinion did not command the support of Justices Powell and 
Blackmun.302 In reviewing the claim that the Commission's order was 
overbroad and encompassed constitutionally protected speech, Justice 
Stevens observed that the Court's scope of review was limited to the 
issue of whether the Commission had the authority to prohibit this par-
ticular broadcast.303 He pointed out that the order was properly limited 
to a specific factual situation, and asserted that "indecency is largely a 
function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract."304 
Admitting that the order might lead to some self-censorship by broad-
casters and that the particular language of the Carlin monologue might 
be protected when used in some other context, Justice Stevens argued 
that the seven indecent words "surely lie at the periphery of First 
Amendment concern."305 The issues having been narrowed to the 
question of whether "the First Amendment prohibits all governmental 
regulation that depends on the content of speech,"306 Justice Stevens 
proceeded to determine that speech of the sort contained in the broad-
cast "is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all cir-
cumstances."307 Justices Powell and Blackmun did not share the 
concept of obscenity, should be controlling. Without disputing that interpretation of 
Hamling, Justice Stevens found it inapplicable to the present case. 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36. 
301. Id. at 3036. 
302. In failing to receive the support of Justices Powell and Blackmun, who did not join 
Parts IV (A) and (B) of the opinion, Justice Stevens spoke only for a plurality of the Court in 
his discussion of the constitutional issues. Part IV (C) of Justice Stevens' opinion, which 
Justices Powell and Blackmun did join, emphasized that "of all forms of communication, it 
is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. at 
3040. 
303. Id. at 3037. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech); 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films». 
306. 98 S. Ct. at 3038. 
307. Id. at 3039. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commer-
cial speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel of private citizen); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel of 
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plurality view that content can be used to determine which speech is 
more "valuable" and therefore more deserving of First Amendment 
protection.308 They did agree, however, that the result in Pacifica 
should turn on the context of the speech at issue.309 
Justice Stevens, again writing for a majority of the Court, ex-
amined the basis for the Commission's conclusion that the special char-
acteristics of the broadcast medium permit the imposition of 
restrictions on the use of language such as that contained in the Carlin 
monologue.310 He agreed with the Commission that broadcasting has a 
pervasive influence on American life and observed that the listeners' 
ability to turn off broadcasts of objectionable material is an insufficient 
means of protecting the privacy of the home from unwanted and objec-
tionable programing.311 He characterized this answer to the problem as 
being akin to "saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after 
the first blow."312 In reversing the court of appeals, the majority also 
relied on the unique accessibility of broadcasts to children. This ease 
of access was found to "amply justify special treatment of indecent 
broadcasting."313 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a strongly-
worded dissent in which he argued that the Court's decision validates a 
process "of governmental homogenization of radio communica-
tions"314 and "permits majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a pro-
tected message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended 
minority."315 Reiterating Chief Judge Bazelon's argument,316 Justice 
Brennan contended that listeners who find such language offensive can 
turn the radio off with a minimum amount of effort.317 He argued that 
public official); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (194~) (fighting words); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (clear and present danger). 
308. 98 S. Ct. at 3046 (powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring). 
309. Id. at 3047. See note 313 infra. 
310. See note 255 and accompanying text supra. 
311. 98 S. Ct. at 3040. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 3040-41. In agreeing with the majority's conclusion, Justice Powell stated: 
"The result turns. . . on the unique characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with 
society'S right to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for 
their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by such offensive 
speech in their homes." Id. at 3047 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Biackmun, J.). 
314. Id. at 3048 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
315. Id. at 3049. 
316. See notes 280-86 and accompanying text supra. 
317. 98 S. Ct. at 3049 (Brennan, J., dissenting): Although agreeing that the individual's 
privacy interests in his home are substantial, Justice Brennan stated that "an individual's 
actions in switching on and listening to communications transmitted over the public airways 
and directed to the public at-large do not implicate fundamental privacy interests, even 
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the availability of this alternative justifies preserving the broadcaster's 
right to disseminate and its listeners' right to receive offensive but 
nonetheless constitutionally protected messages, especially since the ef-
fect of the Court's decision is to replace individual choice as to what is 
heard with governmental regulation of program content.318 
Justice Brennan found the majority's reliance on the unique acces-
sibility of broadcasts to children319 equally unpersuasive. In his view, 
the Carlin monologue could not be considered obscene even as to the 
children.320 The majority decision could therefore result in the screen-
ing from adults of material which could not constitutionally be kept 
from children.32I And even conceding that most parents would not 
want their children to hear language such as that contained in the 
broadcast at issue, Justice Brennan observed that this decision properly 
resides with the parents and not in the government acting in loco 
porentis.322 Addressing the majority's contention that the ideas embod-
ied in the Carlin monologue could just as well have been expressed 
with less offensive language,323 Justice Brennan cited Justice Harlan's 
opinion for the Court in Cohen v. Col!fornio324 for the proposition that 
restricting the use of certain words creates a substantial risk that the 
ideas those words convey will concurrently be restricted.325 
when engaged in within the home. Instead, because the radio is undeniably a public me-
dium, these actions are more properly viewed as a decision to take part, if only as a listener, 
in an ongoing public discourse." Id: at 3048 (citing Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the 
First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579, 618 (1975». 
318. 98 S. Ct. at 3049 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
319. See note 313 and accompanying text supra. 
320. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 213-14 & n.lO (1975). 
321. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 
383-84 (1957) (state may not restrict adults to reading only what is appropriate for children). 
This fear is valid only insofar as the FCC would fail to limit its prohibition against the 
broadcasting of "indecent" language to those hours when children are likely to be in the 
listening audience. See notes 261-62 and accompanying text supra. 
322. 98 S. Ct. at 3051 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that this substitu-
tion of governmental authority for parental discretion distinguished Pac!fica from the 
Court's prior decisions in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Although the majority stressed the principle that parents have a 
right to raise their children as they see fit, see 98 S. Ct. at 3040, Justice Brennan observed 
that the majority decision actually deprives parents of that right by giving what would other-
wise be a parental responsibility to screen media programming to a government agency. Id. 
at 3051 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
323. Id. at 3037 n.18. 
324. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
325. "[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." Id. at 
26. And as Justice Brennan explained: "The idea that the content of a message and its 
potential impact on any who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the 
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The concluding portion of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion 
charged the majority with falling victim to an "acute ethnocentric myo-
pia."326 He accused the majority of failing to acknowledge that the 
supposedly offensive language at issue in Pac!fica is in fact "the stuff of 
everyday conversations" in many of America's subcultures.327 Thus, 
Justice Brennan concluded that when viewed in a broad perspective, 
the decision was "another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to 
force those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of 
thinking, acting, and speaking."328 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White and 
Marshall, Justice Stewart criticized the majority's resolution of the 
question of whether broadcasting is entitled to less First Amendment 
protection than other forms of speech.329 Justice Stewart would not 
have reached the constitutional issues since, in his view, the Court 
should not have construed "indecent" as having a broader meaning 
than "obscene."33o He would have followed the Court's decision in 
Hamling v. United States331 and held that "Congress intended, by using 
the word 'indecent' in section 1464, to prohibit nothing more than ob-
scene speech."332 In the view of the four dissenting justices, the term 
"indecent" should therefore have been construed for purposes of sec-
tion 1464 as it had been in Hamling, with the result that the Carlin 
monologue-concededly not appealing to prurient interests-would 
not have been stripped of its First Amendment protections. 
B. Analysis 
The Court's Pac!fica decision can best be analyzed by a two-part 
consideration. The sections that follow will examine the reasoning un-
derlying the majority's rejection of both the statutory and constitutional 
challenges to the Commission's order. They will also analyze whether 
the Court's judgment is consistent with prior decisions concerning the 
constitutionally permis'sible extent of regulation of protected speech. 
vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious. A given word may have a unique ca-
pacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image." 98 S. Ct. at 3053 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
326. Id. at 3054. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-11 (1977». 
329. 98 S. Ct. at 3055-57. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
330. Id. at 3056. 
331. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). Hamling held that the term "indecent" in IS U.S.C. § 1461 has 
the same meaning as "obscene" under the Court's decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
IS (1973). See note 278 supra. 
332. 98 S. Ct. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
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1. The Statutory Claims 
Circuit Judge Tamm, author of the court of appeals decision; con-
strued 47 U.S.C. § 326333 to prohibit the FCC from interfering with 
licensee discretion in programming. He cited prior FCC and federal 
court cases which he argued established an agency practice of relying 
on each licensee's judgment regarding program content.334 This argu-
ment is also supported by Jack Straw Memorial Foundation ,335 wherein 
the Commission held that the decision whether or not to broadcast ob-
scene or indecent language should be left to the licensee. That case 
involved the broadcasting of admittedly obscene language which was 
part of a recording entitled "Murder at Kent State." The licensee 
broadcast the language based on his decision that it was necessary in 
the context of the recording. The Commission found this exercise of 
licensee discretion to be in conformity with its standards.336 
Judge Tamm also noted that the section 326 prohibition against 
FCC interference with licensee judgement as to programming content 
had been affirmed by the courts as well as by administrative rulingS.337 
He found additional support for his contention that licensee discretion 
should be preserved in the language of the Commission's clarification 
memorandum regarding the original order.338 He pointed out that the 
memorandum acknowledged that (I) some live news coverage of public 
events involves broadcasting offensive speech in circumstances which 
preclude journalistic editing, and (2) licensees who broadcast such lan-
guage should not be subject to Commission discipline.339 The Com-
mission had therefore once again deferred to the judgment of 
individual licensees with respect to programming content. 
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon noted his agree-
ment with Judge Tamm's section 326 argument and asserted that the 
Commission's action in "channeling" broadcasts of indecent language 
into certain hours amounted to censorship.340 He pointed to repeated 
333. See note 273 supra. 
334. 556 F.2d at 14-15 (1977). 
335. 29 F.C.C.2d 334 (1971). 
336. Id. at 354. 
337. 556 F.2d at 14. See, e.g., Writers Guild of America, West. Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 
1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 
(1968), cerl. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). 
338. 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976). See notes 268-71 and accompanying text supra. 
339. 556 F.2d at 14-15. 
340. Id. at 19 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Bazelon found that the § 326 
prohibition is not limited to rules and regulations that totally forbid the broadcasting of 
certain matter, but also bars any form of Commission censorship. He argued that "channel-
ing may have substantially the same effect as ali absolute l?an." Id. 
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FCC abuses of its limited authority to regulate constitutionally pro-
tected speech as one basis for his opposition to any weakening of sec-
tion 326.341 In the collective view of Chief Judge Baze10n and Judge 
Tamm, the FCC order in Pacifica violated the prohibition against cen-
sorship contained in section 326 by permitting the imposition of sanc-
tions for the broadcasting of the language at issue. 
Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens 
agreed that section 326 bars the Commission from editing proposed 
broadcasts in advance. He asserted, however, that this prohibition had 
, never operated to deny the Commission power to review the content of 
completed broadcasts or to take note of the nature of past programs 
when considering license renewal applications.342 He further noted 
that judicial and administrative interpretations of section 326 have de-
veloped the view that its anti-censorship provision does not apply to the 
broadcasting of obscene, indecent or profane language.3.t3 In analyzing 
this point of disagreement between the Supreme Court and the court of 
appeals, it should be noted that the Commission's order did not merely 
examine the past programming of one radio station. Instead, it estab-
lished a new standard for determining permissible language and put 
broadcasters on notice that the language at issue in Pac/fica was not to 
be broadcast during certain hours. While it might be argued that such 
a decree does not amount to pre-broadcast censorship. it creates the 
possibility of an even more dangerous situation, one in which broad-
casters censor themselves by excising protected as well as unprotected 
speech due to excessive caution.344 
The second statutory issue in Pacifica concerned the interpretation 
of 18 U.S.c. § 1464345 and the question of whether the terms "obscene" 
and "indecent" have separate meanings.346 This problem arises in 
many situations involving the regulation of obscene language, due to 
the practice of including a string of generic terms in obscenity statutes. 
Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 prohibits the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, indecent, filthy or vile" articles and 18 U.S.c. § 1464 prohibits the 
broadcasting of "obscene, indecent, or profane language." As a conse-
quence of this practice, the question arose as to whether the terms fol-
lowing "obscene" in these and similar statutes are subsumed under the 
341. Id. at 19 n.l. 
342. 98 S. Ct. at 3033. 
343. Id. at 3034. 
344. Justice Stevens admitted that the Commission order created the possibility of self-
censorship. See id. at 3037. 
345. See note 253 supra. 
346. 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36. 
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parameters of that which is obscene or are meant to establish addi-
tional limitations. 
Pacifica argued that unless the term "indecent" in section 1464 was 
held to mean only "obscene," the statute would be unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad.347 This contention was based on the premise 
that the Supreme Court had defined obscenity in Miller v. Cal!fornia,348 
and had subsequently made it clear in Hamling v. United States349 and 
United States v. 12200-Ft. Reels-oj" Super 8mm Film350 that the use of 
the term "indecent" in federal criminal statutes must be construed to 
refer only to materials involving the specific types of explicit conduct 
set forth in Miller.351 In 12200-Ft. Reels of Film, the Court suggested 
that the term "indecent" should be understood as referring only to rep-
resentations or depictions of "hard core" sexuality: 
If and when. . . a "serious doubt" is raised as to the vagueness 
of the words "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy," 
"indecent," or "immoral" as used to describe regulated material 
in ... 18 U.S.C. § 1462 ... we are prepared to construe such 
terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive representa-
tions or descriptions of that specfftc "hard core" sexual conduct 
given as examples in Miller v. Cal!fornia . . . .352 
The Court in Miller had offered the following examples of speech that 
could constitutionally be regulated: "(a) Patently offensive representa-
tions or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual 
or simulated; (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of 
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals."353 Pacifica argued that it followed from these standards estab-
lished by the Court that the Carlin monologue was not obscene, since it 
neither appealed to the prurient interest nor lacked literary or political 
value.354 Consequently, the argument concluded, the monologue was 
entitled to constitutional protection and the Commission's order should 
be adjudged overbroad.355 
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon accepted Pacifica's 
overbreadth argument. He noted that the Commission's test for "inde-
cency" did not consider the language at issue in light of the "local com-
347. 556 F.2d at 12. 
348. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See note 278 supra. 
349. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See note 331 supra. 
350. 413 U.S. 123 (1973). 
351. See note 278 supra. 
352. 413 U.S. at 130 n.7 (emphasis added). 
353. 413 U.S. at 25. 
354. See id. at 24. 
355. 556 F.2d at 18. 
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munity standards" impliedly required by Miller, but rather used 
"contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium" as its 
touchstone.356 Chief Judge Bazelon pointed out that the Commission's 
indecency standard also ignored the Miller requirement that a work be 
judged as a whole, and that it must appeal to prurient interests to be 
considered obscene.357 He noted that the FCC standard would pre-
clude the broadcasting of indecent language despite the fact that the 
overall work contained literary, artistic, political or scientific value.358 
Consequently, Chief Judge Bazelon concluded that the definition of 
"indecency" in the Commission's order could be upheld only if "there 
exists an additional category of offensive speech that is unprotected 
when broadcast."359 
Chief Judge Bazelon's conclusion was prophetic, in that the 
Supreme Court subsequently did carve out such an additional category 
of unprotected speech in Pac!fica. Writing for the majority, Justice Ste-
vens found that "indecency" was not subsumed under the definition of 
"obscene." He refined the appeal to prurient interest standard enunci-
ated in Miller360 by holding that indecency "merely refers to noncon-
formance with accepted standards of morality."361 Responding to the 
argument that the conclusion in Hamling that section 1461's proscrip-
tion was limited to language falling within the Miller definition of ob-
scenity362 was controlling, Justice Stevens distinguished that case on the 
basis of the different form of media involved there. Since section 1461 
concerns printed matter sent by mail, he reasoned that the construction 
placed on it by the Court was inapplicable to a statute such as section 
1464, which deals with public broadcasting.363 Pacifica's reliance on 12 
200-fl. Reels of Film was dismissed as being based on dicta.364 
Writing for four members of the Court,365 Justice Stewart rejected 
the majority's interpretation of section 1464. He argued that this con-
356. Id. at 22 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (citing 51 F.C.C.2d at 433). 
357. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). See 413 U.S. at 24 
358. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). All of these criteria were enunciated in 
Miller. See note 278 supra. 
359. 556 F.2d at 24 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). 
360. See 413 U.S. at 24. 
361. 98 S. Ct. at 3035 (footnote omitted). The Court's adoption of this definition raises 
several questions, such as what constitutes "nonconformance," whose st.tndards of morality 
are to be considered "accepted," and how these standards are to be communicated to 
broadcasters. 
362. See note 331 supra. 
363. 98 S. Ct. at 3036 & nn.16-17. 
364. Id. at 3035. 
365. Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Brennan, White and Marshall. 
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struction of the statute was plausible but "by no means compelled," 
and that "indecent" should be defined to mean "no more than 'ob-
scene.' "366 Justice Stewart agreed with Pacifica that the decision in 
Hamling was dispositive of the section 1464 interpretation issue. He 
noted that the Hamling Court had limited section 1461 so as to pro-
scribe only those representations or descriptions of hard core sexual 
conduct set out in Miller.367 Justice Stewart could find no adequate 
basis for the majority's conclusion that the term "indecent" had differ-
ent meanings in each of these statutes. He concluded by noting that 
although sections 1461 and 1464 were enacted separately, they were 
codified together in the 1948 Criminal Code under the chapter entitled 
"Obscenity," which suggested that Congress intended that section 1464, 
like section 1461, should prohibit only obscene speech.368 
2. The Constitutional Claims 
The Supreme Court produced a majority decision in resolving the 
statutory issues in Pactfica. The constitutional questions, however, 
fragmented the Court. Most of Justice Stevens' constitutional discus-
sion did not command the support of a majority of the Court, but was 
joined only by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. Justice 
Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice Black-
mun, which set forth his disagreement with certain of the conclusions 
reached by Justice Stevens. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, filed a bitter dissenting opinion in which he addressed the consti-
tutional issues.369 
For Justice Brennan to serve as a spokesman for the dissenters in a 
Supreme Court obscenity decision is a significant indication of the 
shifting tides of interpretation in this area of constitutional law. Justice 
Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Roth v. United States,370 
wherein the Court first promulgated a uniform standard for determin-
ing what speech is obscene. He also authored the plurality opinion in 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts,371 which further refined the Roth standard. 
By 1973, however, the composition of the Court had changed, and Jus-
366. 98 S. Ct. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
367. Id. See note 353 and accompanying text supra. 
368. Id. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
369. Justices Stewart and White expressed no opinion regarding the merits of the consti-
tutional issues in Pac!ftca. They believed that the construction of § 1464 set out in Justice 
Stewart's dissenting opinion, see notes 366-68 and accompanying text supra, made a consti-
tutional analysis unnecessary. 
370. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
371. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
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tice Brennan found himself in the minority when Miller was decided. 
He also dissented in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,3T2 and urged the 
Court to abandon its quest for a viable definition of "obscenity," at 
least insofar as consenting adults were concerned.373 Justice Brennan 
continued to fill the role of minority spokesman in Pac!fica. 
The first of the two constitutional questions considered by Justice 
Stevens' plurality opinion was whether the Commission's order was 
overbroad in that it permitted the imposition of sanctions on the broad-
casting of constitutionally protected speech. Justice Stevens began by 
noting that the Court's review of the order was limited to the question 
of whether it was appropriate in the specific factual context of the 
case.374 Although acknowledging that the order may cause some 
broadcasters to engage in self-censorship, he asserted that this will only 
occur in situations where the material to be broadcast contains "pa-
tently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activi-
ties."37s Such self-censorship, he argued, will not significantly affect 
the content of serious communication because "[t]here are few, if any, 
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive lan-
guage."376 Justice Stevens therefore concluded that invalidating the 
FCC order solely to preserve "the vigor of patently offensive sexual 
... speech" was unwarranted.377 
The second constitutional question which the plurality addressed 
was whether the First Amendment precludes the government from 
punishing the public broadcast of indecent language under any circum-
stances. Justice Stevens acceded to the principle that the First Amend-
ment requires the government to "remain neutral in the marketplace of 
ideas," but he argued that the speech at issue in Pacifica was not an 
essential part of that marketplace.378 In Justice Stevens' view, the ques-
tion was not whether the Carlin monologue was protected speech under 
any circumstances, but rather whether it warranted protection under 
the circumstances in which it was broadcast. Thus, although the Com-
mission itself recognized that the monologue had some literary and po-
372. 413 u.S. 49 (1973). 
373. Id. at 84-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
374. 98 S. Ct. at 3037 (plurality opinion). 
375. Id. (footnote omitted). 
376. Id. at n.18. 
377. Id. at 3037. 
378. Id. at 3038-39: "These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends." 
(Footnote omitted). It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Justic~ Stevens' attempt to 
delineate how the term "indecency" has a separate meaning apart from the concept of "ob-
scenity." See notes 297-98 and accompanying text supra. 
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litical value and expressed a point of view, its objection focused on the 
manner in which that view was expressed.379 Justice Stevens concluded 
this analysis by noting that since the content of the broadcast at issue 
was "vulgar," "offensive" and "shocking," the Court was required to 
examine the context of its dissemination to determine whether the 
Commission's actions were constitutionaP80 
As previously noted, Justices Powell and Blackmun did not join in 
the foregoing constitutional analysis. Justice Powell expressed his disa-
greement with the plurality because he could not "subscribe to the the-
ory that the Justices of this Court are free generally to decide on the 
basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is 
most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most protection, and which 
is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection."381 In his dis-
senting opinion, Justice Brennan also voiced dissatisfaction with the 
analysis utilized in Justice Stevens' plurality opinion. He noted that a 
majority of the Court had rejected the notion "that the degree of pro-
tection the First Amendment affords protected speech varies with the 
social value ascribed to that speech by five Members of this Court."382 
Justice Brennan also took issue with the plurality's assertion that the 
FCC order would not chill free expression because language such as 
that at issue in Pac!ftca is unnecessary to serious communication.383 He 
found it "fallacious" to presume that the content of a message could be 
divorced from the language used to express it.384 
The only constitutional question on which the Court produced a 
majority opinion was whether the unique characteristics of the broad-
cast medium warranted a lower level of First Amendment protection. 
True to Chief Judge Bazelon's suggestion,385 the Supreme Court an-
swered this question in the affirmative. Writing for a majority on this 
issue, Justice Stevens noted that of all forms of communication, broad-
379. 98 S. Ct. at 3038-39 & n.22 (plurality opinion). 
380. Id. at 3039. It is important to note that these constitutional questions were not re-
solved by a majority of the Court. Justice Stevens' discussion of these issues is therefore of 
only limited precedential value. 
381. Id. at 3046 (powell, J., concurring). Justices Powell and Blackmun did concur with 
Justice Stevens' resolution of the statutory issues and in the judgment of the Court. See note 
313 supra. 
382. 98 S. Ct. at 3047 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 3046-47 (powell, J., concur-
ring». Accord, Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
383. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 375-76 and accompanying text 
supra. 
384. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 322-25 and accompanying text 
supra. Accord, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.). 
385. See text accompanying note 359 supra.· 
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casting has received "the most limited First Amendment protection."386 
He advanced two justifications for this disparate treatment: 1) broad-
casting has "established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all 
Americans," jeopardizing individual privacy rights; and 2) broadcast-
ing is "uniquely accessible to children," which implicates the govern-
ment's interest in the "well being of its youth" and warrants greater 
regulation of this particular form of communication.3s7 Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion also stressed the effect the broadcast media has 
on children and emphasized that this was a significant factor in his 
joining Justice Stevens' opinion to create a majority.3SS He noted that 
"[t]he language involved in this case is as potentially degrading and 
harmful to children as representations of many erotic acts."389 
The Supreme Court in Pac[fica delineated another category of 
speech, broadcasting, that is entitled to only limited First Amendment 
protection.390 Although the majority attempted to limit its holding to a 
specific factual context,391 its reasoning would seem to leave open the 
possibility of further expanding the Commission's power to regulate 
the broadcasting of "indecent" speech.392 The decision evinces increas-
ing concern for individual privacy rights and the need to shield chil-
dren from expression viewed as inappropriate for them.393 If in the 
future the Commission finds that "indecent" language was broadcast at 
386. 98 S. Ct. at 3040. 
387. Id. 
388. Id. at 3044-45 (Powell, J., concurring). 
389. Id. at 3045. Justice Powell also noted that broadcasting implicates fundamental 
privacy interests of the individual in his home. In his view, this factor justifies broadcasting 
regulations that would be constitutionally impermissible if imposed upon other forms of 
media. See id. at 3045-46. For Justice Brennan's response to the majority's rationale for 
extending less First Amendment protection to the broadcast media, see notes 314-22 and 
accompanying text supra. 
390. 98 S. Ct. at 3040. Justice Stevens argued that "indecent" speech lies "at the periph-
ery of First Amendment concern," id. at 3037, but this part of his opinion was joined only by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 3046-47 & n.4 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). The result in Pac!fica actually turned on the unique characteri$tics of the broadcast 
media. See id. at 3040-41 (majority opinion), 3047 (powell, J., concurring). For other cate-
gories of speech that are entitled to only limited First Amendment protection, see, e.g., Bates 
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films). 
391. See 98 S. Ct. at 3041 (majority opinion), 3047 (powell, J., concurring). 
392. See id. at 3051-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that the ab-
sence of "principled limits" on the Commission's power in this area could lead to "the 
cleansing of public radio of any 'four-letter words' whatsoever, regardless of their context." 
Id. at 3051. He pointed out that this might result in the banning from radio of noted literary 
works, political speech and portions of the Bible. Id. at 3051-52. 
393. See id. at 3040-41 (majority opinion), 3044-46 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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a time when children were likely to be in the listening audience,394 the 
Court's rationale in deciding Pac[jica would justify the imposition of 
criminal sanctions or other punishment on the disseminator. 
III. The Clergy and the Right to Hold Public Office: McDaniel P. Poly 
The Supreme Court in Mc.Daniel P. Paty395 considered, but failed 
fully to clarify, the scope of religious freedom under the First Amend-
ment.396 The question posed in McDaniel was whether the state of 
Tennessee could bar an individual from seeking an elective position 
solely because of his status as a practicing minister. The decision in 
McDaniel reveals a Court united in agreement that the Tennessee pro-
vision was unconstitutional but divided over the legal basis for that 
conclusion. 
A. The Decision 
Paul McDaniel, a Baptist minister, was a candidate for a position 
as a delegate to the 1977 Tennessee constitutional convention. An op-
ponent, Selma Cash Paty, sued in State Chancery Court for a judgment 
declaring McDaniel disqualified from serving as a delegate to the con-
vention. The basis for her claim was a Tennessee statute which barred 
ministers from seeking this position.397 The Chancery Court held that 
the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution and declared McDaniel an eligible candi-
date. In the subsequent election, he was elected by a large margin. Af-
ter the election, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the 
394. See note 261 and accompanying text supra. 
395. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Last term the Court also decided another case relating to free-
dom of religion, New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). The Court in Cathe-
dral Academy held that a New York statute authorizing reimbursement to parochial schools 
for expenses incurred in performing state-required services during the 1971-72 school year 
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. See note 396 iifra. 
396. The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(emphasis added). 
397. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 848, § 4: "Any citiz:n of the state who can qualify for 
membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly may become a candi-
date for delegate to the convention .... " The requirements for membership in the legisla-
ture include a specific constitutional limitation on participation by the clergy. This 
limitation was originally contained in article VIII, § I of the 1796 Tennessee Constitution 
and is now found in article IX, § 1 of the present state constitution: "Whereas Ministers of 
the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of Souls, and ought not to 
be diverted from the great duties of their functions; therefore, no Minister of the Gospel, or 
priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the 
Legislature." 
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Chancery Court on the ground that the statute imposed no burden 
upon "religious belief' and restricted "religious action ... [only] in 
the law making process of government-where religious action is abso-
lutely prohibited by the establishment clause."398 The Tennessee Court 
found a sufficient state interest in maintaining a separation between 
political and religious activity to warrant the disqualification,399 
notwithstanding the guarantee of the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment.4°O The United States Supreme Court noted probable ju-
risdiction,401 and subsequently reversed the decision of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court,402 began 
his bpinion by tracing the history of the practice of disqualifying minis-
ters from legislative office.403 Drawing from the works of Locke, Jeffer-
son and Madison, the Chief Justice reviewed the historical debate over 
the necessity of excluding ministers from such positions.404 He con-
cluded this review by noting that of the thirteen states which originally 
disqualified members of the clergy, only two, Maryland and Tennessee, 
continued this ban into the twentieth century.405 In 1974, Maryland's 
statute was found unconstitutional as an infringement of the free exer-
cise of religion by a federal district court,406 leaving Tennessee as the 
only state maintaining a bar on clergy holding public office. Despite 
this singular position, the Tennessee statute came to the Court with the 
full support of the state's legislative and judicial branches, a posture 
recognized as supplying a presumption of validity which the Court did 
not summarily reject. 
Notwithstanding this presumption, the plurality found that by 
conditioning McDaniel's right to seek public office on the surrender of 
his right to perform religious functions, Tennessee had impermissibly 
encroached upon his free exercise of religion.407 Chief Justice Burger 
reached this conclusion by relying on the Court's decision in Sherbert v. 
Verner.408 The Court in Sherbert held that a state's refusal to grant 
398. Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d 897, 903 (1977). 
399. £d. at 905. 
400. See note 396 supra. 
401. 432 U.S. 905 (1977) (mem). 
402. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist 
and Stevens. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
403. See generally I A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950). 
404. 435 U.S. at 622-25. 
405. Id. at 625. 
406. Kirkley v. Maryland, 381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974). 
407. 435 U.S. at 626. 
408. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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unemployment benefits to an individual who was unable to find work 
because her religious beliefs prohibited her from working on Saturdays 
imposed an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion.409 
The Chief Justice distinguished the instant case from the Court's deci-
sion in Torcaso v. Watkins,410 reasoning that Torcaso struck down a 
requirement limiting religious helief, whereas the Tennessee statute 
pertained to religious conduct or activity.411 Focusing on McDaniel's 
status as a minister, the plurality concluded that the free exercise 
clause's "absolute prohibition of infringements on the 'freedom to be-
lieve' [was] inapposite here."412 
Because an infringement upon First Amendment values had been 
found,. Chief Justice Burger scrutinized the state interests claimed to 
justify the ban on ministers holding public office.413 The state had ar-
gued that granting ministers the right to hold office would result in 
their exercise of legislative power and influence to promote the interests 
of one particular sect, thus pitting one sect against another and adding 
destructive religious conflict to the already difficult task of running a 
state government.414 The plurality was not persuaded by these asserted 
justifications and found that Tennessee had failed to establish that the 
historically based view of the dangers of clergy participation in the po-
litical processes had contemporary validity.415 Consequently, the 
Court held the Tennessee statute violative of the First Amendment 
right to the free exercise of religion.416 
Justice Brennan filed a lengthy concurring opinion417 in which he 
argued that the decision in Torcaso418 should be controlling. He re-
409. Id. at 403-06. 
410. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso the Court invalidated a Maryland constitutional 
requirement that applicants for public office declare their belief in God. The Court held that 
this test violated the freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Id. at 496. 
411. 435 U.S. at 627 (footnote omitted). 
412. Id. 
413. Chief Justice Burger cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972), for the 
proposition that "[t)he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only 
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion." 435 U.S. at 628 & n.8. In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Brennan questioned this reliance. See id. at 635 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
414. Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d at 904-06. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
referred to the religious wars in Ireland and Lebanon as examples "that the human race has 
not advanced to a degree of civilization that will permit us to conclude that the fervor of 
religion will never again disturb and disrupt secular affairs and government." Id. at 906. 
415. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 629. 
416. Id. 
417. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall. 
418. See note 410 supra. 
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jected the distinction relied upon by the plurality between religious be-
lief and religious conduct or activity.419 Justice Brennan pointed out 
that "freedom of belief protected by the Free Exercise Clause embraces 
freedom to profess or practice that belief, even including doing so to 
earn a livelihood."420 In addition to the free exercise violation, Justice 
Brennan found that the Tennessee statute violated the establishment 
clause.421 He noted that except in a few, limited situations, government 
cannot use religion as a basis for imposing "duties, penalties, privileges 
or benefits."422 Justice Brennan concluded his opinion by stating his 
faith in the self-corrective nature of the political process. He asserted 
that all individuals should have an opportunity to present their views in 
the "marketplace of ideas" for acceptance or rejection at the polls.423 
Justice Stewart filed a brief concurring opinion in which he voiced 
his agreement with Justice Brennan that Torcaso should be controlling. 
He found the differences between the two cases to be without constitu-
tional significance.424 Justice Stewart rejected the plurality's view that 
religious status and religious belief are separable for purposes of free 
exercise analysis.425 He argued that the Tennessee statute "penalized 
an individual for his religious status-for what he is and believes 
in-rather than for any particular act generally deemed harmful to 
society. "426 
Justice White filed a concurring opinion in which he offered a 
wholly different rationale for the Court's judgment. He found that the 
Tennessee statute which absolutely prohibited members of a particular 
class, in this case ministers, from holding public office, to be in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jus-
tice White adopted this approach because the plurality and concurring 
opinions failed to persuade him that McDaniel's free exercise of reli-
gion was in any way restricted by the Tennessee statute.427 Using an 
equal protection analysis, however, Justice White concluded that the 
state's interests were insufficient to warrant excluding the affected 
class.428 This conclusion was further supported by his finding that the 
419. 435 U.S. at 634 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). See notes 410-12 
and accompanying text supra. 
420. 435 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
421. See note 396 supra. 
422. 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
423. Id. at 642. 
424. Id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
425. See notes 410-12 and accompanying text supra. 
426. 435 U.S. at 643 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring). 
427. Id. at 643-44 (White, J., concurring). 
428. Id. at 645: "All'50 States are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
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Tennessee statute was both underinclusive and overinclusive.429 
B. Analysis 
The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court in McDaniel is 
not surprising in light of the disappearance of clergy-disqualification 
statutes elsewhere in the United States.430 The differences in approach, 
however, warrant examination. Seven members of the Court431 be-
lieved that the protection afforded by the free exercise clause of the 
First Amendment compelled the reversal of the judgment of the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court. Beyond this consensus, these justices produced 
three different opinions; two favored the interpretation of Torcaso set 
forth by Justice Brennan,432 while the plurality distinguished Torcaso 
and relied on Sherbert.433 
The issue separating these two segments of the Court is how far 
the scope of the free exercise clause can be extended in the face oflegit-
imate state interests.434 The view derived from Torcaso, that any stat-
ute which compels an individual to eschew protected religious practices 
as a condition of office is unconstitutional,435 was rejected by a plurality 
of the Court. The plurality instead found that the Tennessee disqualifi-
cation provision operated against McDaniel because of his status as a 
minister.436 Stating that the meaning of "minister" or "priest" is a 
maintain a separation between church and state, and yet all of the States other than Tennes-
see are able to achieve this objective without burdening ministers' rights to candidacy. This 
suggests that the underlying assumption on which the Tennessee statute is based-that a 
minister's duty to the superiors of his church will interfere with his governmental service-is 
unfounded." 
429. Id. Justice White pointed out that the statute was underinclusive in that its limita-
tions did not apply to executive and judicial office-seekers. He found the statute to be over-
inclusive since it also applied to ministers whose religious beliefs would not interfere with 
the proper discharge of the duties of a delegate to the constitutional convention. 
430. See notes 405 & 406 and accompanying text supra. The decision in McDaniel tech-
nically leaves intact the Tennessee Constitution's bar on clergy serving as legislators, since 
only the statute relating to constitutional convention delegates was invalidated by the Court. 
435 U.S. at 629. The decision in McDaniel nonetheless casts serious doubt on the constitu-
tional validity of the underlying constitutional prohibition. See note 397 supra. 
431. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall 
and Stewart. 
432. See notes 417-20 and accompanying text supra. 
433. See notes 408-12 and accompanying text supra. 
434. In distinguishing Torcaso, the plurality noted that the First Amendment extends 
absolute protection to freedom of belief, which counsels against expanding the scope ofthl!t 
provision for fear ofleaving "government powerless to vindicate compelling state interests." 
435 U.S. at 627 n.7. 
435. See id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.). 
436. Id. at 626-27. See notes 410-12 and accompanying text supra. 
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question of state law,437 the plurality interpreted the available authority 
as indicating that "ministerial status is defined in terms of conduct and 
activity rather than in terms of belief."438 Based on this reading of state 
authority, the plurality concluded that the Tennessee statute's limita-
tion was different from that in Torcaso which specifically limited the 
right to hold public office to those who professed belief in God.439 
Justice Brennan argued that the Court had no justification for 
equating "status" with "activity." Referring to the fact that Torcaso's 
refusal to declare a belief in God was viewed by the plurality as an act 
based on religious belief whereas McDaniel's performance of the func-
tions of a minister were not so considered,440 he stated: "I simply can-
not fathom why the Free Exercise Clause 'categorically forbids' hinging 
qualification for office on the act of declaring a belief in religion, but 
not on the act of discussing that belief with others."441 Justice Bren-
nan's disagreement with the plurality's distinction between belief and 
activity apparently must await future Court terms for resolution. The 
absence of a clear-cut guideline on this issue is likely to pose problems 
for lower courts left in confusion as to what criteria to employ in deter-
mining whether certain activity involves freedom of belief so as to com-
mand absolute constitutional protection. 
The members of the Court who utilized a freedom of religion anal-
ysis in McDaniel were in agreement regarding both the unconstitution-
ality of conditioning eligibility for office on the abandonment of 
religious activity and the support for that conclusion provided by 
Sherbert.442 In relying on Sherbert, however, none of these justices re-
sponded directly to the argument relied upon by the lower court that 
Braunfeld v. Brown443was controlling. In Brau'!leld, the Court sus-
437. The plurality simultaneously asserted that they were not bound by the Tennessee 
court's resolution of the issue, but were only required to consider it. 435 U.S. at 627 n.5. 
438. Id. at 627 (footnote omitted). For a criticism of this interpretation, see id. at 643 n.* 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
439. See note 410 supra. 
440. See 435 U.S. at 626-27. 
441. Id. at 635 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (footnote omitted) (em-
phasis in original). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart pointed out that the activ-
ity /belief dichotomy, as previously enunciated by the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), reflected the Court's judgment that acts claimed to constitute a free 
exercise of religion were still subject to judicial review so that "acts harmful to society 
should not be immune from proscription simply because the actor claims to be religiously 
inspired." 435 U.S. 643 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart asserted that McDan-
iel's disqualification was not based on his acts but rather on his beliefs. Id. 
442. 435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion), 633-34 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Mar-
shall, J.). 
443. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
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tained a Sunday closing law despite conceding that it necessarily made 
the practice of religion by Orthodox Jewish merchants more expensive. 
Their religious beliefs required them to close on Saturday and the state 
law required them also to close on Sunday, thus resulting in two days 
of lost business. The Braunfeld Court held that the state's interest in 
having a uniform day of rest justified the "indirect burden" imposed on 
Orthodox Jews by the closing laws.444 
The Tennessee Supreme Court had found that the disqualification 
statute, like the law at issue in Braunfeld, imposed only an indirect bur-
den on McDaniel's free exercise of his religious beliefs.445 It held that 
this indirect burden was justified by the state's interest in preserving the 
separation of church and state, an interest even more compelling than 
that asserted in Braunfeld.446 The Tennessee court distinguished 
Sherbert on the ground that no compelling state interest could be 
shown in Sherbert to warrant the state's denial of unemployment bene-
fitS.447 The failure of any of the opinions in Mc.Daniel to respond to the 
lower court's analysis of Braunfeld adds to the lack of standards for the 
resolution of free exercise questions. 
To a certain extent, the "indirect burden" doctrine enunciated in 
Braunfeld was echoed by Justice White in his concurring opinion, in 
which he chose to adopt an equal protection approach to the issues 
presented. Justice White felt compelled to analyze the issues in 
Mc.Daniel by reference to the equal protection clause because the plu-
rality had failed "to explain in what way McDaniel has been deterred 
in the observance of his religious beliefs."448 He argued that Tennes-
see's disqualification statute did not interfere with McDaniel's free ex-
ercise of religion since the minister was not compelled to abandon the 
ministry or disavow any of his beliefs.449 This implicit adoption of the 
indirect burden doctrine is susceptible to the same criticism made of the 
Braunfeld decision-that there is nothing "indirect" about compelling 
an individual to choose between the unfettered exercise of one's reli-
gious beliefs and the rights and privileges of citizenship, including 
holding public office. 
The various decisions of the justices in Mc.Daniel illustrate once 
again the difficulty the Court has encountered in positing clear guide-
444. Id. at 606-07. 
445. Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d at 905. 
446. Id. 
447. Id. at 907. See notes 408 & 409 and accompanying text supra. 
448. 435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring). 
449. Id. at 643-44. 
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lines for resolving the difficult questions arising under the free exercise 
and establishment clauses. While the result in Mc.Daniel may be satis-
factory in that it repudiates a doctrine long rejected by most states, it is 
llIlfortunate that the Court was unable to base its decision on a com-
mon ground expressed in a single opinion. 
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